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DOUBLE AND NOTHING
OPEN GOVERNMENT IN MONTANA UNDER
ARTICLE II, SECTION 9 AND SECTION 10
Peter Michael Meloy*
Anyone who has served on a policy-making body knows it is much
easier making decisions in private because the discussion is more robust
and the participants feel freer to ask questions and make comments that
might be embarrassing if made in public. Custodians of government docu-
ments also maintain a proprietary interest in those documents and have a
general reluctance to share them with every soul who comes by to examine
them. These natural proclivities had some support in the law before 1972.
The delegates to the 1972 Constitutional Convention changed all that.
The collective sense of the Convention was that while governing in private
might be more efficient, it seriously affected the people’s trust in their gov-
ernment. Accordingly, the delegates proposed and adopted Article II, Sec-
tion 9, requiring governments to hold open meetings and make documents
accessible to guarantee a person’s fundamental right to know, thereby au-
thorizing the judiciary to ensure that such guarantees were not subverted.1
In promulgating the provision, Montana became one of a very few states in
the Union with a specific constitutional guarantee of access to government
meetings and documents. This article reviews the legislative and judicial
treatment of Article II, Section 9, since the 1972 Constitution was ratified.
During most of this period, the courts have been generally supportive
of transparency in government. Recently, however, there has been a dis-
turbing trend in the decisions of the Supreme Court to return to the old
tradition of what Justice Nelson called “translucency.”  In his dissent from
the Court’s adoption of the Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement, he
expressed his disappointment with the Court’s decision to retain the private
* Peter Michael Meloy has been a member of the Montana Bar since 1971. He has been in private
practice since 1974 with a focus on public access to government meetings and documents. He has been
involved in a number of the cases discussed in this article on behalf of citizens and newspapers seeking
access to meetings and records. As Director of Legal Services for the Montana Legislative Council in
1972 he worked with Constitutional Convention Delegates on legal issues during the Convention.  He
served in the Montana Legislature as Majority Whip (1975) and Majority Leader (1977) and sponsored
several bills related to open meetings and documents.  He thanks his former partner and good friend the
Hon. Terry N. Trieweiler and the Hon. James Nelson for reading this article and providing insightful
comments. The author is enormously grateful to the editorial staff of the Montana Law Review, led by
Emily Gutierrez Caton, for its invaluable commentary and tireless effort in assuring his characterization
of the source material was reasonably accurate. And, he gives a special thanks to his daughter Maile
Meloy whose well-honed editing skills made this piece readable.
1. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 9.
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discipline provisions of the old rule. He believed that the process must be
transparent if the public is going to have trust in the Court’s disposition of
complaints against attorneys.2 Private discipline made the process “translu-
cent,” like a bathroom window: light comes in, but nothing can be seen.
In 1978, the Montana Law Review published a series of comments on
the 1972 Montana Constitution.3 The focus of the compilation was on rights
guaranteed in the new Constitution that had no counterparts in the U.S.
Constitution and how judicial consideration of these new rights might play
out. David Gorman’s comment on the right to know (Article II, Section 9)
and the right of privacy (Article II, Section 10) discusses the potential “col-
lision” of these concepts as they developed in future jurisprudence.4 Noting
that the courts had yet to address these two rights, he advocated a method of
“reconciling” the rights.5 He contended the courts should follow existing
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence developed in the federal context to deter-
mine whether a valid privacy right exists, and then “the court would deter-
mine whether the public’s right to know constitutes a compelling state inter-
est within the context of the case.”6 The court would only proceed to the
balancing test of Article II, Section 9, if it found the litigant’s right to know
constituted a compelling state interest.7 In sum, he would have the courts
“double up” on the right to know by reading the compelling interest thresh-
old into the right-to-know guarantee.8 This “doubling up” creates a signifi-
cant obstacle for citizens who seek access to government documents and
meetings. Not only would a petitioner need to establish that the demands of
individual privacy did not clearly exceed the merits of public disclosure, but
he or she would also bear the nearly impossible burden of showing there
was a compelling interest in disclosure. Gorman urged this analysis to as-
sure that upholding the right to know did not “avoid, and thus denigrate, the
scope and weight to be accorded the right of privacy.”9
This article will present the author’s view that it is unnecessary to rec-
oncile Sections 9 and 10 of Article II because the Convention delegates
harmonized the two opposing rights within the text of Section 9: “No per-
son shall be deprived of the right to examine documents or to observe the
actions and deliberations of all public officials or agencies of state govern-
2. See In re: Revising the Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement, Admin. Or. No. 06-0628
(Mont. Nov. 9, 2010).
3. Daniel Kemmis, Environmental Rights, 39 MONT. L. REV. 224 (1978); Jeanne M. Koester,
Equal Rights, 39 MONT. L. REV. 238 (1978); David Gorman, Rights in Collision: The Individual Right
of Privacy and the Public Right to Know, 39 MONT. L. REV. 249 (1978).
4. Gorman, supra note 3, at 249. R
5. Id. at 266.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 266–67.
9. Id. at 267.
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ment and its subdivisions, except in cases in which the demand of individual
privacy exceeds the merits of public disclosure.”10 While the Montana Su-
preme Court has developed its jurisprudence governing open meetings and
records by construing Section 9 as a stand-alone right, it has also included a
discussion of Section 10’s right of privacy in many of its opinions. As a
general proposition, the Court has remained “particularly vigilant and un-
compromising in protecting Montanans’ constitutional ‘right to know.’”11
However, when the Court has failed to vindicate the public’s right to know,
it invariably relied on a separate reading of the right of privacy contained in
Section 10 and required the requesting litigant to establish a compelling
interest to observe the meeting or examine the documents. This “doubling
up” has produced anomalies in the enforcement of the right to know and
created uncertainty about when the privacy exception to the right of access
will be applied to deny access to meetings and documents.
This article reviews the origins of the right to know and privacy, legis-
lative implementation of those rights, and the Supreme Court rulings since
ratification of the new Constitution. Other authors have published articles in
the Montana Law Review since Gorman. They include Professor Larry
Elison and Dennis Nettiksimmons’s oft-cited article on the Right of Pri-
vacy,12 Jim Goetz’s Interpretations of the Montana Constitution: Sometimes
Socratic, Sometimes Erratic,13 Professor Fritz Snyder’s The Right to Par-
ticipate and the Right to Know in Montana,14 Snyder and Mae Nan Elling-
son’s The Lawyer-Delegates of the 1972 Montana Constitutional Conven-
tion: Their Influence and Importance,15 and Adam Wade’s excellent analyt-
ical comment, Billings Gazette v. City of Billings: Examining Montana’s
New Exception to the Public’s Right to Know.16 This article contains a com-
prehensive treatment of the decisional law interpreting Article II, Section 9,
and examines the circumstances under which the Court has restricted public
access, tipping the scale away from the essential purpose of Article II, Sec-
tion 9, which was to guarantee citizens full access to government decisions.
10. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 9 (emphasis added).
11. Goldstein v. Commission on Practice of the Supreme Court of Mont., 995 P.2d 923, 946 (Mont.
2000) (Nelson, J., dissenting).
12. Larry M. Elison & Dennis Nettiksimmons, Right of Privacy, 48 MONT. L. REV. 1 (1987).
13. James H. Goetz, Interpretations of the Montana Constitution: Sometimes Socratic, Sometimes
Erratic, 51 MONT. L. REV. 289 (1990).
14. Fritz Snyder, The Right to Participate and the Right to Know in Montana, 66 MONT. L. REV.
297 (2005).
15. Fritz Snyder & Mae Nan Ellingson, The Lawyer-Delegates of the 1972 Montana Constitutional
Convention: Their Influence and Importance, 72 MONT. L. REV. 53 (2011).
16. Adam Wade, Note, Billings Gazette v. City of Billings: Examining Montana’s New Exception
to the Public’s Right to Know, 76 MONT. L. REV. 185 (2015).
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I. POPULISM IN ACTION
After the Second World War, a non-partisan group of professional wo-
men and homemakers joined together as the Montana League of Woman
Voters, taking the motto “Democracy is not a spectator sport.”17 The
League appeared before the Montana Legislature throughout the late 1950s
and 1960s on matters related to open government and public participation.
Most of the testimony was given by members who appeared before the
Legislature without pay, promoting the public interest. But in 1967, the
League sent part-time lobbyists to Helena, one of whom, Dorothy Eck, be-
came a full-time lobbyist in 1969.
During those years, the Montana Legislature was a “good old boy”
club. It had few women and was dominated by hard-drinking cowboys in
smoke-filled rooms where important legislative policy was made in secret.
Until the late 1960s, the lobbyists for the Northern Pacific railroad, the An-
aconda Company, and the Montana Power Company made or influenced
virtually all legislative decision-making. But the decline of the railroads and
the collapse of the copper industry in the late 1960s loosened the grip of
corporate interests on the reins of public policy and created a vacuum in
Montana politics.
Michael Malone and Richard Roeder described this phenomenon in
Montana, A History of Two Centuries:
By the late 1960s, Montanans seemed to be changing their minds about their
state and about themselves. . . . Unlike previous generations, who had tended
to see their future and the future of their children in leaving the state, the
newer generation of Montanans found appealing reasons for staying. This atti-
tude expressed itself in a new concern for preserving the environment, a re-
newed pride in community, and a new interest in reforming and improving
society and government. Not since the Progressive Era had Montana seen
such widespread popular participation in politics . . .18
In 1969, the Legislature sent a referendum to Montana voters calling
for a Constitutional Convention.19 This referendum passed overwhelmingly
and in a special election in 1971, Montanans elected 100 delegates to re-
write the 1889 Montana Constitution.20 Not one of these delegates were
existing office holders and few had prior legislative experience. Indeed, the
delegates were, across the board, highly educated and motivated by public
interest, rather than corporate greed. “My God,” said one delegate, “what if
17. About the League, LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF MONT., https://permacc/F468-S4G9 (last
revised Jan. 8, 2016).
18. MICHAEL P. MALONE et al., MONTANA: A HISTORY OF TWO CENTURIES 394 (rev. ed. 1991).
19. Id.
20. Id.
4
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our legislators had been of this caliber over the past decade. We’d be the
most progressive state in the Union.”21
These delegates also had the benefit of other state constitutional revi-
sion efforts. Their young, well-educated staff compiled volumes of research
on each issue to be resolved in constructing this new charter. Gallatin
County elected Dorothy Eck as its delegate.22 When the Convention met,
she was elected to the Convention leadership as Western District Vice Pres-
ident and appointed to the Bill of Rights Committee.23 Prior to her service
as a delegate, Dorothy Eck lobbied for the League, and experienced, first-
hand, a governmental apparatus that was closed to public influence. The
Convention delegates wrote:
Public trust does not come from just a matter of confidence in the integrity of
public officers, but rather it comes from knowing that public affairs are placed
in the public eye. This can only occur when the activities of government are
visible and when there are ways of checking on what our public officials are
doing.24
II. THE RIGHT TO KNOW
Delegate Eck introduced Proposal No. 57, “A Proposal for a New Con-
stitutional Section Providing for Citizen Rights of Access to Government
Documents and Procedures.”25 Seven other delegates, including Bob Camp-
bell from Missoula, co-sponsored the proposal.26 Campbell became the pri-
mary sponsor of a subsequent proposal, which eventually became Article II,
Section 10, the right to privacy, which added significance to his co-sponsor-
ship for the right to know. The text of Proposal 57 read:
Section_______. No person shall be deprived of the right to examine docu-
ments or to observe the actions and deliberations of all public officials or
agencies of state government and its subdivisions, except in cases in which
the demand of individual privacy exceeds the merits of public disclosure.27
In approving this proposal, the Bill of Rights Committee recommended pas-
sage of the proposal with minor changes:
Section 9. RIGHT TO KNOW. No person shall be deprived of the right to
examine documents or to observe the deliberations of all public bodies or
agencies of state government and its subdivisions, except in cases in which
the demands of individual privacy exceeds the merits of public disclosure.28
21. K. ROSS TOOLE, RAPE OF THE GREAT PLAINS: NORTHWEST AMERICA, CATTLE AND COAL 214
(1976).
22. 1 MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 42 (1979).
23. Id. at 25.
24. Id. at 462–63.
25. Id. at 157.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. 2 MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 631 (1979).
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The Committee Comments reflect the intent and purpose of the provision:
In the main, the provision is from Delegate Proposal 57. It is a companion to
the preceding right of participation. Both arise out of the increasing concern
of citizens and commentators alike that government’s sheer bigness threatens
the effective exercise of citizenship. . . . The committee intends by this provi-
sion that the deliberation and resolution of all public matters must be subject
to public scrutiny. It is urged that this is especially the case in a democratic
society wherein the resolution of increasingly complex questions lead to the
establishment of a complex and bureaucratic system of administrative agen-
cies. The test of a democratic society is to establish full citizen access in the
face of this challenge.29
During the Style and Drafting process, the word “clearly” was added
to the balancing provision: “except in cases in which the demand of individ-
ual privacy clearly exceeds the merits of public disclosure.”30 According to
the sponsor, “clearly” was inserted to assure that the balance would favor
disclosure: “[W]e added the word ‘clearly’, with the intention of tipping the
balance in favor of the right to know.”31
III. THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY
The Bill of Rights Committee also recommended the adoption of a
separate right of privacy. According to the Committee, the purpose of the
provision was to “accomplish[ ] . . . the elevation of the judicially-an-
nounced right of privacy to explicit Constitutional status.”32 Citing Gris-
wold v. Connecticut33 and State v. Brecht,34 the comment acknowledged
that the courts had already recognized this right federally and in Montana.35
In Griswold, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Connecticut law forbid-
ding use of contraceptives unconstitutionally intruded upon the right of
marital privacy.36 In Brecht, the Montana Supreme Court reversed a convic-
tion based on testimony of Brecht’s deceased wife’s sister that while listen-
ing on an extension phone she overheard Brecht allegedly threatening his
wife.37 The district court’s admission of this testimony constituted a viola-
tion of the right of privacy and was reversible error.38
29. Id.
30. 1 MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, REPORT OF COMM. ON STYLE, DRAFTING, TRANSI-
TION AND SUBMISSION ON SUFFRAGE AND ELECTIONS 11 (1972).
31. 5 MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION VERBATIM TRANSCRIPT 1670 (1979) [hereinafter
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION TRANSCRIPT].
32. MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, supra note 28, at 632. R
33. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
34. 485 P.2d 47 (Mont. 1971).
35. MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, supra note 28, at 632. R
36. 381 U.S. at 485.
37. Brecht, 485 P.2d at 50.
38. Id. at 50.
6
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Thirteen years later, the Montana Supreme Court overruled Brecht,
holding that Article II, Section 10, did not apply to privacy invasions by
non-state actors. In State v. Long,39 the Court concluded that the privacy
provision only applied to state actions, not those of non-state privacy in-
fringements. The Long holding is inconsistent with the Constitutional Bill
of Rights Committee comments suggesting that the Legislature may wish to
impose additional “safeguards,” such as prohibiting employers from sub-
jecting employees to lie detector tests as a condition of employment.40
During the Convention, the recommended privacy language for Article
II, Section 10, was drawn from Bob Campbell’s Proposal No. 33 and read:
Section 10. RIGHT OF PRIVACY. The right of privacy is essential to the
well-being of a free society and shall not be infringed without the showing of
a compelling state interest.41
During the floor debates, Delegate George Harper successfully moved
to delete the compelling interest standard.42 Two days later, Delegate
Thomas Ask requested Delegate Harper reconsider the deletion of the stan-
dard.43 He explained that it would be impossible to predict how a court
would interpret an absolute right of privacy.44 Delegate Ask explained that
adding the compelling interest standard would give direction to the court:
“If there’s no compelling state interest, you can’t invade a person’s right of
privacy.”45 After Delegate Wade Joseph Dahood assured the body that the
Bill of Rights Committee had no objection to re-inserting the standard, the
motion to reconsider passed and Article II, Section 10, reclaimed its com-
pelling interest standard.46
It is unclear whether the delegates knew the “compelling interest” con-
cept was a creature of equal protection analysis. “Compelling interest” is
the fulcrum of strict scrutiny jurisprudence under state and federal equal
protection mandates. Courts have long applied a compelling interest test in
measuring whether government action may contravene fundamental rights.
The test requires the state or federal government to justify the deprivation
“by a compelling state interest and [the law] must be narrowly tailored to
effectuate only that compelling interest.”47 In Gryczan v. State, the Court
concluded that statutes criminalizing same-sex acts could not meet strict
39. 700 P.2d 153, 156–57 (Mont. 1985).
40. MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, supra note 28, at 633. R
41. Id. at 632.
42. CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION TRANSCRIPT, supra note 31, at 1681–82. R
43. 6 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION TRANSCRIPT 1850–51 (1979).
44. Id. at 1851.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1852.
47. Gryczan v. State, 942 P.2d 112, 122 (Mont. 1997) (citing State v. Siegal, 934 P.2d 176, 184
(Mont. 1994)).
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scrutiny or a compelling interest under Article II, Section 10.48 There are
only a handful of cases in the history of Anglo-American jurisprudence in
which a governmental entity has met its burden to justify a rule under a
strict scrutiny analysis.49 If a statute is subject to strict scrutiny, the statute
is nearly always struck down.50
Whether or not the Delegates intended to impose a strict scrutiny stan-
dard to government intrusions on privacy in Article II, Section 10, it is clear
this right of privacy was only designed to “codify” the previously recog-
nized privacy rights under state and federal law. The Delegates created it to
protect people from government intrusion in their homes. The spirit of the
debates indicate that the Bill of Rights Committee was not enacting a provi-
sion governing access to government records and meetings. That determina-
tion would be made under Article II, Section 9. Otherwise, there would
have been no reason to put the balancing test in Article II, Section 9. Addi-
tionally, imposing the compelling interest test on public access to docu-
ments or meetings changes the entire dynamic of the legal analysis.
IV. THE DEBATES
Delegate Eck rephrased the Committee comments when moving to
adopt Article II, Section 9. She expressed the concern of citizens and com-
mentators alike, that the government’s enormity threatens the effective ex-
ercise of citizenship:
The committee notes this concern and believes that one step which can be
taken to change this situation is to constitutionally presume the openness of
government documents and operations. [Section 9 of Article II] stipulates that
persons have the right to examine governmental documents and the delibera-
tion of all public bodies or agencies, except to the extent that the demands of
individual privacy clearly outweigh the needs of the public right of disclosure.
The provision applies to state government and its subdivisions. The commit-
tee intends by this provision that the deliberations and resolution of all public
matters must be subject to public scrutiny.51
Addressing the tension between the right to know and the right of pri-
vacy contained in Article II, Section 9, Delegate Eck explained:
48. Id. at 126.
49. See the Montana Supreme Court’s struggle with this concept in Pfost v. State, 713 P.2d 495,
500–01 (Mont. 1985), overruled by Meech v. Hillhaven W., Inc., 776 P.2d 488 (Mont. 1989). As the
Supreme Court in Arneson v. State ex rel. Dep’t of Admin., Teachers’ Ret. Div., 864 P.2d 1245, 1250
(Mont. 1993) recognized, “[i]f a statute invades a ‘fundamental’ right or discriminates against a ‘sus-
pect’ class, it is subject to strict scrutiny.” (quoting Massachusetts Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307,
319 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
50. But see Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 217–18 (1944) (upholding statute even after
subjecting it to a strict scrutiny analysis).
51. CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION TRANSCRIPT, supra note 31, at 1670 (emphasis added). R
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We do recognize, however, that there are some cases where the right to know
what is in a document that might be classified may exceed the right of pri-
vacy. There are times when the right to know what is going on in a delibera-
tion regarding personnel, which ordinarily would be classified and would not
be public—we considered it private—but there are times when the public
right to know clearly exceeds the individual person’s right to privacy in this
case. You might have an agency head, for instance, whose dismissal is being
considered. If there is—if he is being dismissed for cause, I would think that
the public has a right to know that reason of dismissal.52
Since the provision was clearly “self-executing,” the Committee appointed
the courts as the governmental body responsible for enforcing the public’s
right to know:
We had assumed that the court also would pretty well define the exceptions;
in other words, they would determine what the cases are in which the de-
mands of privacy exceed the demands of public disclosure; and I think it was
pretty well the agreement of our committee that we would prefer this method
of determination.53
Shortly before taking a vote on the proposed Article II, Section 9, Delegate
George Heliker inquired of Delegate Dahood as to whether the privacy ex-
ception included corporations:
CHAIRMAN GRAYBILL: Mr. Heliker, for what purpose do you arise?
DELEGATE HELIKER: I would like to ask Mr. Dahood a question.
CHAIRMAN GRAYBILL: Okay. (Laughter) Mr. Dahood.
DELEGATE DAHOOD: I yield, Mr. Chairman.
DELEGATE HELIKER: Mr. Dahood, being an ignorant nonlawyer, what is
an individual?
DELEGATE DAHOOD: What is an individual?
DELEGATE HELIKER: Is it by any chance also a corporation?
DELEGATE DAHOOD: A person can, of course, Dr. Heliker, as you well
know, be defined to include a corporation under the law.
DELEGATE HELIKER: I know a person can, but can an individual?
DELEGATE DAHOOD: An individual, in my judgment, would not be a cor-
poration, no.54
There were some Delegates who thought it was more advantageous to
authorize the legislature to define the exception.55 In pursuit of this prefer-
ence, Delegate Jerry Cate moved to add language to the provision “except
as may be provided by law.”56 He explained his amendment: “[i]t has the
effect of putting the Legislature in as the arbiter of the cases excepted.”57
Before Delegate Cate’s amendment was considered, however, Dele-
gate Fred Martin made a substitute motion to delete the right-to-know sec-
52. Id. at 1670–71.
53. Id. at 1671.
54. Id. at 1680.
55. Id. at 1671.
56. Id.
57. Id.
9
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tion in its entirety.58 Delegate Martin was a career newsman who, at the
time of his service in the Convention, was the editor of the Livingston En-
terprise and Park County News.59 While the Montana Press Association
appeared in support of the provision earlier when it was heard in the Bill of
Rights Committee, it now called the provision the “right-to-conceal” and
was lobbying hard to kill it.60 The concern was that the exception for indi-
vidual privacy was a loophole that “could be interpreted to allow almost
any public board, agency or administrator to cover up vital private mat-
ters.”61 The newspapers thought the public would be served better without
any constitutional provision at all.62 In 1963, the press had successfully
engineered the passage of § 82-3401 of the Revised Codes of Montana,
which required open meetings subject to a list of exceptions,63 preferring to
take chances with the Legislature rather than the courts.64 However, Dele-
gate Martin’s substitute motion was rejected on a vote of 76-14.65
Thereafter, the Convention debated and voted on Delegate Cate’s mo-
tion to let the Legislature define what would be open or closed to the pub-
lic.66 His motion drew more votes than Delegate Martin’s had, but the mo-
tion still failed 56-30.67 Delegate Eck’s motion to adopt the right-to-know
provision as reported by the Bill of Rights Committee passed on a voice
vote.68
As the Convention continued its business constructing the rest of the
new charter, the Montana news media relentlessly pressured the delegates
to abandon the right-to-know section. Indeed, almost all of the daily news-
papers editorialized against the provision. The harshest criticism was ex-
pressed in an editorial published on the front page of the Billings Gazette, in
which the editor threatened that opposition to this right-to-know provision
would jeopardize ratification of the entire Constitution.69
Concerned that this threat might be realized, the Chair of the Bill of
Rights Committee, Delegate Dahood, moved to reconsider the section dur-
ing the Style and Drafting sessions of the Convention.70 He did so to insert
language which would give the Legislature the power to define the bounds
58. Id. at 1672.
59. MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, supra note 22, at 52. R
60. CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION TRANSCRIPT, supra note 31, at 1672. R
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1672–73.
63. Id. at 1670.
64. Id. at 1671.
65. Id. at 1676.
66. Id. at 1677–79.
67. Id. at 1679.
68. Id. at 1680.
69. 7 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION TRANSCRIPT 2488 (1979).
70. Id. at 2484.
10
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of privacy which would justify closing a meeting or denying access to a
document.71 Delegate Dahood proposed to insert, in lieu of the privacy ex-
ception, the phrase: “except in cases in which the Legislature, subject to
court interpretation, shall have determined that the demands of individual
privacy exceed the merits of public disclosure.”72 The original sponsor of
the proposal, Delegate Eck, supported Delegate Dahood’s amendment.73
Before the Convention could vote on that amendment, Delegate Carl
Davis, the long-time Beaverhead County Attorney, moved to delete the en-
tire section.74 He reasoned the Legislature would implement the right to
know, whether or not it was specifically authorized to do so. He thought
deletion of the entire section would let the press “go and lobby the Legisla-
ture on how they want this done.”75 His motion failed 56-33, but the pro-
posed deletion received 19 more votes than Delegate Martin’s earlier mo-
tion.76
Considerable discussion on the Dahood motion ensued. Delegate Don-
ald R. Foster argued in support of the amendment because of concerted
pressure from the newspapers.77 He did not think the amendment made any
substantive change, but was willing to accept it to ameliorate the press.78
Some opposed the motion because of the heavy media lobbying. Some op-
posed based on a mistrust of the Legislature. Delegate Noel D. Furlong
contended, tongue in cheek, that the best option was to eliminate freedom
of the press altogether. He felt the original provision “has to do with the
right of the people, the little guy, to find out what’s going on, and I resist
the motion to be stampeded into changing this thing . . . . The press will
take care of itself, lets [sic] us take care of the people.”79
President Leo Graybill yielded the chair to Delegate Magnus Aasheim
so he could speak on the motion.80 Of all the speakers that afternoon, Presi-
dent Graybill articulated the clearest rationale for the section as it was origi-
nally proposed and adopted:
What’s going to happen is the Legislature’s going to pass a statute of some
kind, that’s going to list all of the incidences that it thinks should be secret.
Now if you know the Legislature as I do, they’re not going to do that in one
line; there’s going to be a lot of different things that are secret. They’re going
to have the same trouble we’re going to have, or we’re having. They’re going
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 2488–89.
74. Id. at 2491–92.
75. Id. at 2492.
76. Id. at 2493.
77. Id. at 2494.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 2493.
80. Id. at 2496.
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to put a lot of words in that statute. And when somebody comes to the agency
and wants to know—let’s say it’s the reporter or let’s say it’s a person—when
they come to the agency and want to know, or when they try to get into the
agency meeting, who’s the first person that’s going to interpret the Legisla-
ture’s language? It ain’t going to be the courts, it’s going to be the agency. So
the more language you give that agency to work with, the less to know there’s
going to be left, because they’ll be able to interpret it right out of the window.
So if the press really wants to lock this state up, just let them have the Legis-
lature pass a nice, long-as-your-arm statute about what’s secret; and every-
thing will be secret by the time the agency, or the agency head, or the agency
lawyer get his hands on it and advises whether the people can come to the
meeting or whether the papers can be shown to the press. I don’t think the
press has yet thought this thing through. The press has to go and demand what
it wants, and if an agency makes an unreasonable determination, the press has
to take them to court and whip them; that’s the only way this thing’s going to
work. But the way the committee originally drew it, at least the little guy’s
got something to say to that agency man when he goes to the door; he’s got
the Constitution. But he hasn’t got anything when we get through amending
it. So I think, Mr. Foster, you could do the press a big favor, and I’m sure we
could all help Mr. Furlong protect the people, if they’ll just let us write the
Constitution and they’ll write the articles.81
Even with the majority of the Bill of Rights Committee voting aye on
the motion to put the Legislature in charge of implementing the privacy
exception, it failed, 70-18.82 As a result, the judiciary would decide when
and under what circumstances the right-to-know guarantee would be
trumped by a right of privacy. The original language of Article II, Section
9, was adopted and voters ratified the new Constitution in November of
1972.
The Convention transcript of the debates on the new right-to-know
guarantees shows how the delegates envisioned it would be applied. The
section, like its neighbors in the Bill of Rights, is clearly self-executing. The
resounding defeat of Delegate Cate’s initial amendment, and Delegate
Dahood’s later proposal to put the Legislature in charge of what would be
private, emphasizes that reading. The Convention delegates intended to start
with a balance tipped in favor of openness (“clearly exceeds”) and the
courts would enforce the guarantee:
DELEGATE WILSON [to Delegate Berg]: Would you foresee a lot of litiga-
tion, separate litigations on these particular issues?
DELEGATE BERG: No, I foresee that there will be litigation. I foresee that
there will be interpretations, and that final decisions will be achieved through
the courts.83
81. Id. at 2496–97.
82. Id. at 2498.
83. Id. at 2501.
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V. THE LEGISLATURE
When the Legislature met in 1973, subcommittees were formed to
work during the interim between the 1973 and 1974 annual sessions to pre-
pare any necessary legislation precipitated by the new Constitution. The
Subcommittee on Constitution, Elections, and Federal Relations was com-
missioned to “conduct a detailed study leading to draft legislation imple-
menting article II, sections 8 and 9 of the 1972 Montana constitution.”84
The study was completed in December of 1973.85 It concluded that
while Article II, Section 9, was self-executing: “[t]here is no inherent prohi-
bition in the section itself against any statute or regulation which deprived a
person of the right to observe public deliberations or documents as long as
(1) the statute or rule was consistent with the proviso protecting individual
privacy and (2) authorized a case by case determination as to whether the
demands of individual privacy exceeded the merits of disclosure.”86 How-
ever, the purpose of the study was to determine whether existing statutes
were valid in view of the new constitutional provision.87
The study identified three categories of existing statutory law gov-
erning the right to know: “(1) those that authorized closed meetings, (2)
those that protect documents in the custody of a public body which relate to
individual people, and (3) those that protect documents in the custody of a
public body which relate to corporations.”88 In the first category was Rev.
Codes of Mont. § 75–6127 (permitting school boards to close collective
bargaining strategy sessions) and § 82–3402 (requiring open meetings sub-
ject to certain exceptions).89
According to the study, because § 75–6127 did not involve a question
of individual privacy, it “clearly violates the ‘right to know’ and should be
repealed.”90 Section 82–3402 authorized a closed meeting when the discus-
sion pertained to:
1. National or state security;
2. Disciplining of a public officer or employee;
3. Employment, appointment, promotion, dismissal, demotion or resignation
of any public officer or employee;
84. S. J. Res. 1, 43d Cong. (Mont. 1972).
85. SUBCOMM. ON CONSTITUTION, ELECTIONS & FED. RELATIONS, RIGHT TO KNOW, RIGHT TO PAR-
TICIPATE, INTERIM STUDY (Mont. 1973) [hereinafter RIGHT TO KNOW, RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE INTERIM
STUDY].
86. Id. at 7–8.
87. Id. at 1, 7.
88. Id. 8.
89. Id.
90. Id.
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4. Purchasing of public property, investing of public funds which might ad-
versely affect the public security of financial interest of state or political
subdivisions of the state;
5. Revocation of any license of any person licensed under the state;
6. Law enforcement, crime prevention probation or parole.91
According to the study, “[i]tems one and four do not in any way relate
to individual privacy. . . . The items, then, are clearly unconstitutional.”92
Items two, three, five and six do relate to individual privacy and would have
to be determined on a case-by-case basis “to determine whether: 1. The case
involved a question of individual privacy, and 2. whether the demands of
individual privacy clearly exceeded the merits of public disclosure.”93 Since
the statute created absolute exceptions, not subject to the discretionary lan-
guage of the new constitutional provision, amendments to existing statutes
were necessary to comply with the new constitutional guarantee. Those
amendments would, at a minimum, contain: (1) “A definition of what con-
stitutes a ‘deliberation,’” (2) “A method of enforcing the provision,” and
(3) “A general statement authorizing the body holding the meeting” or
agency possessing a record to make the balancing test on a case-by-case
basis.94 At the time, the Legislature did not consider (nor has it ever consid-
ered) establishing a set of factors by which privacy and disclosure would be
balanced. The Legislature seemed to presume the courts would undertake
this task on a case-by-case basis.
The study also identified statutes protecting documents concerning
natural persons, e.g. Rev. Codes of Mont. § 7–147 (records of borrowers of
building and loan associations), § 10–703 (adoption records), § 48–139
(marriage applications), and § 71–1520 (welfare records).95 Indeed, the
study listed 28 separate statutes prohibiting release of certain public
records.96 There were also at least 15 separate statutes under which records
of corporations could not be publicly disclosed: § 3–709 (bean dealer
records), § 3–1721 (commercial fertilizer records), § 50–1221 (hard-rock
mining permit applications), § 84–3406 (records of produce dealers), etc.97
According to the study, it was necessary to distinguish between laws
governing natural persons and corporations because the Convention debates
made it clear that a corporation was not an “individual” with protected pri-
91. Id. at 8–9.
92. Id. at 9.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 9–11.
96. Id. at 9–12.
97. Id. at 16–17.
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vacy interests under Article II, Section 9.98 The Heliker/Dahood exchange,
supra, was quoted verbatim in the study.99 Unfortunately, before legislative
action was taken on the study, Attorney General Robert Woodahl issued an
official AG opinion construing the word “individual” in Article II, Section
9, to apply to corporations as well as natural persons.100
Two “implementation” bills accompanied the report.101 One recast the
existing open meeting statute by imposing the Article II, Section 9, consti-
tutional mandate, providing a definition of “deliberation” (two or more
members of a body discussing public business) and “public body” (any pol-
icy-making body of the State or its subdivisions, including bodies “sup-
ported in whole or in part by public funds”) and imposing a criminal pen-
alty for violation of the right to know.102 Sections 82–3402 and 75–6127 of
the Revised Codes of Montana were both repealed under the bill.103
The second bill implemented the right-to-examine-documents portion
of Article II, Section 9.104 Its operative provision established a process by
which the custodian of a document would disclose a document containing
information related to individual privacy.105 The constitutional balancing
test was included in the statute. The balancing test additionally required the
custodian of the document to notify the individual about whom the informa-
tion pertained that the custodian would release the document unless the in-
dividual (within five days of the notice) established that the demands of
privacy clearly exceeded the merits of disclosure.106 All records of any pub-
lic body, without exception, were covered by the bill.107 Forty-one existing
confidentiality statutes would be repealed, including those related to mar-
riage and adoption records.108
The bills (H.B. 720 and 721) were assigned to Rep. Michael Greely to
carry in the 1974 second annual session. Both bills passed the house, but
were killed in the Senate.109 Constituent groups of those protected by the
respective confidentiality statutes vigorously opposed the open records bill.
Opposition to the open records bill, particularly by the adoptive parents’
98. It took the Montana Supreme Court thirty years to arrive at this conclusion and to cite the same
Convention debate transcript relied upon in the 1973 study. Great Falls Tribune v. Montana Pub. Serv.
Comm’n, 82 P.3d 876, 881–83 (Mont. 2003).
99. RIGHT TO KNOW, RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE INTERIM STUDY, supra note 85, at 15. R
100. Mont. Att’y Gen. Op. 19, 35; Mont. Att’y Gen.Op. 45, 48 (1973).
101. H.R. 720, 43d Leg., Spec. Sess. (Mont. 1974); H.R. 721, 43d Leg., Spec. Sess. (Mont. 1974).
102. Mont. H.R. 720, at 1.
103. H. JOURNAL, 43d Leg., Spec. Sess. 25 (Mont. 1974).
104. Mont. H.R. 721.
105. Id. at § 2.
106. Id. at §§ 2–3.
107. Id. at § 3.
108. MONT. H. JOURNAL, 43d Leg., Spec. Sess., at 25.
109. Rev. Codes of Mont. 1947, 83 (1977).
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organization, was so vociferous that Greely, a popular Cascade County na-
tive in an overwhelmingly Democratic county, came within fifteen votes of
losing his bid for election to the Montana Senate in the fall of 1974 (Greely
received 1,756 votes. His opponent, Dr. M.F. Keller, received 1,742.).110
In the 1975 session of the Montana Legislature, HB 412 was intro-
duced. HB 412 was virtually identical to HB 720 from the previous session.
HB 412 passed the Legislature.111 The bill also added a provision to the
criminal code making it “official misconduct” to close a meeting in viola-
tion of the law.112 In 1977, HB 302 again amended Rev. Codes of Mont.
§ 82–3402 by deleting the specific exceptions and adding a general balanc-
ing test similar to Article II, Section 9.113 This general section also con-
tained a provision authorizing an individual to waive the right of privacy,
causing the meeting to be open.114 However, it also permitted closing a
meeting when a public body discussed collective bargaining or litigation
strategy.115 It included a new section defining a meeting as the convening
of a quorum of the body either in person or by electronic means.116 Cell
phones and email were still in the future in 1977. An enforcement feature
was also added permitting a district court to set aside a decision made in
violation of the law.117 Interestingly, the Senate amended the bill to exclude
the Legislature’s caucuses and conference committees.118 A conference
committee rejected this effort. (Ironically, the conference committee meet-
ing was held without any public notice as allowed by legislative rules at the
time.) The bill adopted in 1977 remains the law today, with a few minor
changes made in the subsequent 40 years.
VI. THE COURTS
Since the task of giving life to Article II, Section 9, was left to the
courts, the success or failure of achieving the purposes of the constitutional
guarantee can be measured by its treatment by the judiciary. Eight years
passed before the Montana Supreme Court had the occasion to address its
first right-to-know dispute.
110. Secretary of State Election returns, General Election 1974, S324.2021 S2g (on file with the
Secretary of State).
111. 1975 Mont. Laws 1237.
112. Id. at 1237–38.
113. 1977 Mont. Laws 1237.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1886.
116. Id. at 1887.
117. Id.
118. Mont. Code Ann. § 82–3402 (1977).
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The Worden119 case arose when two governmental bodies tussled over
whether the county violated the public’s right to know. The Yellowstone
County Commission had held a public hearing over a proposed subdivision.
Two days after the hearing, the Commission conducted a telephonic meet-
ing where the subdivision was approved. One of the commissioners did not
receive notice of this conference call and did not participate. When the local
school board impacted by the subdivision learned of this approval it com-
menced a mandamus action seeking to nullify the decision because it was
made in closed session.120 A number of significant access issues were
presented and resolved by the Supreme Court in this case of first impres-
sion. First, the Court determined that mandamus was not an appropriate
method of addressing an open meetings violation, and suggested a simple
petition for relief as a better device.121 Second, the Court found that so long
as a quorum was present during the telephonic conference, it was still a
“meeting” covered by the open meetings laws.122 Third, the Court rejected
the county’s contention that the telephonic meeting did not need to be no-
ticed, because it was merely a continuation of the meeting about which
adequate notice was given.123 The Court held:
In Montana, notice is required by sections 2-3-103 and 7-5-2122, MCA. The
contested “meeting” here failed to comply with the notice requirements of
both those sections. Respondents contend that the newspaper story printed in
the “Yellowstone County News” and the fact that they held public meetings
under the Montana Subdivision and Platting Act sufficiently complied with
the above notice provisions. This interpretation of the facts and the law is
mistaken. The newspaper article did not provide sufficient facts concerning
the “meeting’s” time and place to inform the public sufficiently prior to the
final decision to permit further public comment on the matter. . . . It is diffi-
cult to envision an open meeting held without public notice that still accom-
plishes the legislative purpose of the Montana “open meeting” statutes. With-
out public notice, an open meeting is open in theory only, not in practice. This
type of clandestine meeting violates the spirit and the letter of the Montana
Open Meeting Law.124
Several months later, the Court issued an opinion concluding that,
“Art. II, Sec. 9 clearly provides that any person has the constitutional right
to observe court proceedings unless the demand of individual privacy
clearly exceeds the merits of public disclosure.”125 Moreover, the Court
concluded, “[f]rom the foregoing it is apparent that the Montana Constitu-
119. Board of Trs., Huntley Project Sch. Dist. No. 24, Worden v. Board of Cnty. Comm’rs of Yel-
lowstone Cnty., 606 P.2d 1069, 1073 (Mont. 1980).
120. Id. at 1070.
121. Id. at 1074–75.
122. Id. at 1073.
123. Id. at 1073–74.
124. Id. at 1073.
125. Great Falls Tribune v. District Court of Eighth Judicial Dist., 608 P.2d 116, 119 (Mont. 1980).
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tion imposes a stricter standard in order to authorize closure than does the
United States Constitution. Art. II, Sec. 9 of the Montana Constitution has
no counterpart in the Federal Constitution.”126 The Court imposed a finding
of “strict and irreparable necessity” to preserve fair trial rights before a
criminal voir dire could be closed to the public.127 These first two Supreme
Court decisions reflect an abiding commitment by the Court to give the
broadest reading to the public’s right to know.
However, in its next three opinions issued over the following two
years the Court did the opposite. In 1981, in Mountain States Telephone &
Telegraph Co. v. Department of Public Service Regulation,128 the Court
concluded that a corporation was protected by the individual right of pri-
vacy, and its records could be withheld from public disclosure under Article
II, Section 9. Unfortunately, neither party to the case cited the Convention
debates, which clearly demonstrated an intent that the right of privacy only
extend to natural persons and not corporations.
To make matters worse, the Court coupled the “compelling state inter-
est” concept with its analyses under Article II, Section 9:
We are reinforced in this conclusion [that corporate records were subject to
individual privacy] by Mont. Const., Art. II, 10, which states: “The right of
individual privacy is essential to the well-being of a free society and shall not
be infringed without the showing of a compelling state interest.” Showing a
compelling state interest is an equal protection test, and it comes into play if
the statute or State Constitution affects a fundamental right.129
A year later, the Court rendered a decision that would have far-reach-
ing implications for open government. In Montana Human Rights Division.
v. City of Billings,130 the Court adopted an analytical standard for determin-
ing whether, and to what extent, documents retained by a governmental
entity were protected from disclosure under Article II, Section 10. In the
course of investigating a charge of discrimination against the City of Bill-
ings, the Montana Human Rights Commission (MHRC) subpoenaed em-
ployment files for city employees. The city refused to provide the informa-
tion unless MHRC obtained consent to disclose from each employee. The
city contended that these files contained many matters which most individu-
als would not willingly disclose publicly. Accordingly, this information was
protected by Article II, Section 10.131
126. Id. at 120.
127. Id. at 120–21.
128. 634 P.2d 181, 188–89 (Mont. 1981), overruled by Great Falls Tribune v. Montana Pub. Serv.
Comm’n, 82 P.3d 876, 883 (Mont. 2003).
129. Id. at 188.
130. 649 P.2d 1283 (Mont. 1982).
131. Id. at 1285–88.
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Unfortunately, in resolving the case, the Court cited David Gorman’s
1978 Montana Law Review article and concluded that the subpoena could
only be enforced if there was a compelling state interest.132 The Court then
applied the Fourth Amendment standard, adopted by the U.S. Supreme
Court in Katz v. United States,133 for evaluating if information is protected.
This standard is whether the party involved subjectively expected the infor-
mation to be private, and whether society is willing to recognize that expec-
tation as reasonable.134
Applying this standard, the Court found that the information requested
by the MHRC was subject to the protection of Montana’s constitutional
right of privacy, articulated in Section 10 of the Montana Constitution.135
And, while the Court concluded that an investigation of discrimination by
MHRC constituted a “compelling state interest” justifying the subpoena, the
records would be disclosed only under a strict protective order preventing
public disclosure.136
Ultimately, the Court was asked to determine whether records in the
custody of a local government entity were subject to disclosure.137 Al-
though another governmental agency made the request, the issue should
have triggered the accepted analysis under Article II, Section 9. Instead, the
Court resolved the case by applying the “compelling interest” test of Article
II, Section 10.138 The Court in Montana Human Rights Division, did not
examine or even cite the disclosure guarantees of the right to know. This
oversight is significant because the Supreme Court has cited the Montana
Human Rights Division decision in almost every subsequent opinion con-
struing public access to meetings or documents under Article II, Section 9.
That same year, the Court again weakened the thrust of the right to
know in State ex rel. Smith v. District Court of Eighth Judicial District.139
The issue in Smith was whether, and to what extent, fair trial rights could
justify closure of a pre-trial suppression hearing.140 As discussed above, the
Court in Great Falls Tribune v. District Court of Eighth Judicial District,
concluded that only “strict and irreparable necessity” could justify closing
voir dire to the public.141 In Smith, the Court held that the public and press
132. Id. at 1286.
133. 389 U.S. 347, 351–352 (1967).
134. Id.
135. Mont. Human Rights Div. v. Billings, 649 P.2d 1283, 1287–88 (Mont. 1982).
136. Id. at 1291.
137. Id. at 1284–85.
138. Id. at 1285–86.
139. 654 P.2d 982, 987 (Mont. 1982).
140. Id. at 985.
141. Id. (citing Great Falls Tribune v. District Court of Eighth Judicial Dist., 608 P.2d 116, 120–21
(Mont. 1980)).
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could be excluded from a suppression hearing “only if dissemination of
information acquired at the hearing would create a clear and present danger
to the fairness of defendant’s trial and no reasonable alternative means can
be utilized to avoid the prejudicial effect of such information.”142
The Court grafted this “clear and present danger” test from the Ameri-
can Bar Association’s recommended practice in federal courts under the
First and Sixth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.143 Adoption of this
test retreats from the Court’s pronouncement in Great Falls Tribune two
years earlier that Article II, Section 9 affords broader access guarantees than
the U.S. Constitution.144 While still imposing a difficult standard for clo-
sure of court proceedings, Smith’s “clear and present danger” test clearly
provides a lower bar than “strict and irreparable necessity.”
In 1983, the Supreme Court first addressed the closing of a local
school board meeting to discuss a personnel matter. In Jarussi v. Board of
Trustees of School District No. 28, Lake County,145 the Court narrowly fo-
cused its scrutiny. The school board closed the meeting to exclude an em-
ployee, not the general public.146 The district justified excluding a teacher it
planned to fire based on the collective bargaining exception to the open
meeting statute.147 While the dispute giving rise to the case did not involve
public access, the Court recognized that the collective bargaining exception
was inapplicable:
If we were to adopt the Board’s interpretation of collective bargaining, an-
other avenue would be available to close public meetings. This undermines
the policy of the Open Meeting Law and is contrary to the legislative mandate
that the open meeting provisions should be liberally construed.148
Jarussi added two important principles to the law of public access
under Article II, Section 9. First, it breathed life into the statutory direction
that open meeting laws be construed liberally. Second, it voided the deci-
sion made in the closed session. The invalidation caused the board to miss
its statutory deadline for dismissing teachers and resulted in extending the
teacher’s contract for another year. This provided a financial incentive for
school boards to follow the open meetings laws.
In 1984, the Court again doubled up the privacy analysis under Article
II, Section 9 with the compelling interest analysis under Article II, Section
10.149 The Missoulian newspaper sued the Board of Regents for the state
142. Id. at 987.
143. Id.
144. District Court of Eighth Judicial Dist., 608 P.2d at 120–21.
145. 664 P.2d 316 (Mont. 1983).
146. Id. at 317.
147. Id. at 319.
148. Id. at 320.
149. Missoulian v. Board of Regents of Higher Educ., 675 P.2d 962, 970–71 (Mont. 1984).
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universities to gain access to the periodic evaluations the board performed
of the various presidents in the university system.150 “The discussions cen-
tered on personal relationships and personalities, subjective evaluation of
various personnel or faculty, and the presidents’ management style, meth-
odology and decision-making approach. Other areas of discussion included
family, health, personal plans, relationships with Board members and
faculty-administration relations.”151 The Missoulian wanted to observe
these discussions to report to its readers how these public officials were
performing.152 The Missoulian argued that university presidents can have
no reasonable expectation of privacy except in the narrow areas of personal
health and family that do not affect job performance.153
The Court rejected this argument and reiterated its holding in Montana
Human Rights Division, “that a privacy interest will yield only to a compel-
ling state interest.”154 The Court then announced it would “balance the
competing constitutional interests in the context of the facts of each case, to
determine whether the demands of individual privacy clearly exceed the
merits of public disclosure. Under this standard, the right to know may out-
weigh the right of individual privacy, depending on the facts.”155
The Court concluded that the demands of individual privacy of the
presidents clearly exceeded the merits of public disclosure.156 But in relying
on its compelling interest analysis in Montana Human Rights Division and
an expanded view of “the merits of public disclosure” the Court turned the
right to observe on its head, finding that there was a public interest in clos-
ing evaluations: “[b]ut a broader inquiry is required by the constitutional
and statutory provisions and has been employed by this Court in previous
cases.”157 The Court appeared to conclude that there was substantial public
value in a closed evaluation and also appeared to agree with the lower
court’s observation that “frank, honest and critical evaluations would not
occur without confidentiality” and, accordingly, closed meetings actually
served the public interest.158 This, of course, is the rationale all public offi-
cials use to justify closed meetings, and is directly contrary to the stated
purposes of Article II, Section 9.
150. Id. at 966.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 964.
153. Id. at 967.
154. Id. at 971.
155. Missoulian, 675 P.2d at 971 (first emphasis added, second emphasis in original).
156. Id. at 973.
157. Id. at 971.
158. Id. at 972.
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Three years passed before the Court addressed another challenge to
denial of access. In Belth v. Bennett,159 the Court relied on its prior holdings
to conclude that a corporation is entitled to privacy protections, and, based
on Missoulian, Montana Human Rights Division, and Mountain States Tele-
phone & Telegraph Co., that the demands of individual privacy of insur-
ance companies outweigh the merits of public disclosure. However, Justice
John Sheehy issued a stinging dissent, joined by Justice William Hunt, ex-
coriating the majority’s thinking that the public need not know information
in the hands of the auditor regarding the health of insurance companies.160
Two years later, in Engrav v. Cragun,161 the Court applied its “com-
pelling interest” jurisprudence in affirming a district court’s conclusion that
a student’s request for certain criminal justice information does not consti-
tute a compelling interest necessary to disclosure:
Privacy rights of individuals in Montana are more substantial than the rights
guaranteed in the United States Constitution. Montana Human Rights Divi-
sion, 649 P.2d at 1286. Before this Court will invade the individual privacy of
the persons involved, a compelling state interest to do so must be found.
There is no compelling state interest here which allows the dissemination of
the requested information. Appellant wishes to do a study for a school re-
search project; this is not a sufficient state interest.162
In that same year, and in the face of the Court’s continual doubling up
on right-to-know prerequisites by insisting that the requestor satisfy the
compelling interest test, the Court reversed course in Great Falls Tribune
Co. v. Cascade County Sheriff.163 The Tribune had been covering a story
involving the abuse of a prisoner by the city police and county sheriff depu-
ties. The officers were disciplined by their respective employers. The Trib-
une asked for the names of the officers. The sheriff complied, but the city
refused to disclose the names of the officers, citing individual privacy. The
Tribune sued and the district court ordered the city police chief to disclose
the names. The task on appeal for the Tribune was to overcome the compel-
ling interest effect of Montana Human Rights Division, Missoulian, Belth,
and Engrav. The Tribune argued and the district court agreed that it simply
was “not good public policy to recognize an expectation of privacy in pro-
tecting the identity of a law enforcement officer whose conduct is suffi-
ciently reprehensible to merit discipline.”164
The Court reviewed the four precedential cases, but elected to devise a
new analysis which considered the nature of the public employee’s job
159. 740 P.2d 638, 639 (Mont. 1987).
160. Id. at 644–45 (Sheehy, J., dissenting).
161. 769 P.2d 1224, 1229 (Mont. 1989).
162. Id. at 1229.
163. 775 P.2d 1267 (Mont. 1989).
164. Id. at 1267–69.
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when determining the weight of privacy rights in the balancing test under
Article II, Section 9:
The law enforcement officers in the present case may have had a subjective or
actual expectation of privacy relating to the disciplinary proceedings against
them. However, law enforcement officers occupy positions of great public
trust. Whatever privacy interest the officers have in the release of their names
as having been disciplined, it is not one which society recognizes as a strong
right . . . . The conduct of our law enforcement officers is a sensitive matter so
that if they engage in conduct resulting in discipline for misconduct in the line
of duty, the public should know. We conclude that the public’s right to know
in this situation represents a compelling state interest.165
While the Court continued to apply the “compelling interest” test of Section
10, it created a new approach to measure the weight of the privacy right
dependent on the role the individual played in society. If the individual
asserting the right of privacy occupied a position of public trust and had
engaged in conduct contravening that trust, the individual had diminished
privacy rights which would not outweigh the merits of public disclosure
under the compelling interest standard. Great Falls Tribune spawned a
progeny of cases in which the Court tipped the balance in favor of disclo-
sure of records related to individuals in positions of public trust whose con-
duct violates that trust.166
Later in that year, the Court decided a case based on the balancing test
set forth in Article II, Section 9—without relying on Article II, Section
10—ruling that an insurance company was entitled to copies of an accident
report maintained by the Billings police department involving one of its
insured:
As the language of the right to know provision indicates, the tension between
these two guarantees is aggravated by the fact that they are textually interde-
pendent. In general, all citizens have an absolute right to observe and examine
the operation of agencies within government. Curtailment of this right is only
justified “in cases in which the demand of individual privacy clearly exceeds
the merits of public disclosure.”167
The compelling interest provision of Article II, Section 10 was not
relied upon by the Court in applying the provisions of the right to
know.168Although Lacy is rarely cited in the annals of right-to-know juris-
prudence, it marks a turning point in the Court’s approach to Article II,
Section 9, away from the doubling up of the Article II, Section 10 compel-
ling interest concept and toward implementation of the self-executing provi-
sions of Article II, Section 9 by itself.
165. Id. at 1269.
166. See infra cases discussed.
167. Lacy v. City of Billings, 780 P.2d 186, 187–88 (Mont. 1989).
168. Id. at 187–89.
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A year later, the Court considered an open meetings issue in the pro se
appeal of Robert Flesh in Flesh v. Board of Trustees of Joint School District
No. 2, Mineral & Missoula Counties.169 Flesh, an Alberton resident, was
upset about an article an assistant administrator had written criticizing his
conduct. Flesh filed a grievance against the administrator. The board con-
sidered the grievance in a session closed to the public and then deliberated
in private. Flesh did not seek to void the meeting; rather, he sought a declar-
atory order that the board not close its meetings in the future. However,
since Flesh challenged the closure within the appropriate statute of limita-
tions, the district court considered the merits of the claim and denied re-
lief.170 On appeal, the Court reverted to the privacy rights test devised in
Missoulian and Montana Human Rights Division that it called a “two-part
test”: “(1) whether the person involved had a subjective or actual expecta-
tion of privacy; and (2) whether society is willing to recognize that expecta-
tion as reasonable.”171 The Court concluded the administrator had an expec-
tation of privacy over the grievance hearing, and society recognized that
right as reasonable.172 The opinion summarily disposed of the constitutional
balancing test, saying, “In this case there is no showing of any public inter-
est to be served by a public meeting but a substantial showing of a legiti-
mate employee privacy interest to be protected by closing the meeting.”173
The Court seemed unimpressed by Flesh’s pro se claims and instead placed
its entire focus on the right of privacy.
The next three right-to-know cases decided by the Court were facial
challenges to several exceptions contained in the statutory open meetings
law. In Associated Press v. Board of Public Education,174 the Court struck
down the litigation strategy exception as it applied to legal disputes between
two governmental entities. Holding that Article II, Section 9 is “unique,
clear and unequivocal” the Court found that the statutory authorization to
close a meeting to discuss litigation strategy violated the guarantee.175 In
Associated Press v. State,176 the Court concluded that Montana Code Anno-
tated § 46–11–701(6), authorizing the sealing of an affidavit in support of
leave to file a criminal charge, impermissibly closes records otherwise re-
quired to be open under Article II, Section 9. Finally, in Great Falls Trib-
une Co. v. Great Falls Public School, Board of Trustees, Cascade
169. 786 P.2d 4, 5–6 (Mont. 1990).
170. Id. at 7.
171. Id. at 8.
172. Id. at 9.
173. Id.
174. 804 P.2d 376 (Mont. 1991).
175. Id. at 379.
176. 820 P.2d 421 (Mont. 1991), abrogated by Plumb v. Fourth Judicial Dist. Court, Missoula Cnty.,
927 P.2d 1011 (Mont. 1996).
24
Montana Law Review, Vol. 79 [2018], Iss. 1, Art. 4
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol79/iss1/4
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\79-1\MON103.txt unknown Seq: 25  6-MAR-18 15:49
2018 DOUBLE AND NOTHING 73
County,177 the Court struck down the collective bargaining strategy excep-
tion of Montana Code Annotated § 2–3–203(4), concluding, “the collective
bargaining strategy exception is an impermissible attempt by the Legisla-
ture to extend the grounds upon which a meeting may be closed.”178
In 1992, the Court revisited the jurisprudence governing access to per-
sonnel records in Citizens to Recall Mayor James Whitlock v. Whitlock.179
There, the plaintiffs sought access to an investigatory report into sexual
misconduct allegations brought by the city judge against the Mayor of
Hamilton.180 Recognizing that “[t]his is not the first time we have suggested
that public officials may occupy unique positions in regard to expectation of
privacy,”181 the Court drew from its earlier ruling in Great Falls Tribune v.
Cascade County Sheriff, and concluded that an elected official is “properly
subject to public scrutiny in the performance of his duties . . . In this case,
the sexual harassment allegations against Whitlock go directly to the
mayor’s, and another government official’s, abilities to properly carry out
their duties. Information related to the ability to perform public duties
should not be withheld from public scrutiny.”182
The Court also held that its earlier rulings protecting personnel files
were inapposite because the plaintiffs here sought records related to an in-
vestigation into misconduct:
However, in this case, the Toole Report was the result of an investigation
commissioned to explore allegations of misconduct. The Citizens Group is
not seeking disclosure of information related to private sexual activity, gen-
eral performance evaluations, or proceedings where Whitlock’s character, in-
tegrity, honesty, or personality were discussed. While Whitlock might reason-
ably expect privacy in regard to those kinds of matters, society will not permit
complete privacy and unaccountability when an elected official is accused of
sexually harassing public employees or of other misconduct related to the
performance of his official duties.183
A year later, the Court applied this doctrine to police investigatory
records involving a Bozeman police officer accused of sexual assault of
another officer while attending the police academy. In Bozeman Daily
Chronicle v. City of Bozeman Police Department,184 Justice James Nelson,
who would write the Court’s most resolute opinions vindicating the public’s
right to know, ordered the release of the investigatory report. His opinion
starts with “the now-familiar two-part test to determine whether an individ-
177. 841 P.2d 502 (Mont. 1992).
178. Id. at 505.
179. 844 P.2d 74 (Mont. 1992).
180. Id. at 76.
181. Id. at 78.
182. Id. at 77–78.
183. Id. at 78.
184. 859 P.2d 435 (Mont. 1993).
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ual has a protected privacy interest under Article II, Section 10, of the Mon-
tana Constitution.”185 He reasoned that while the Chronicle had a right to
know, the inquiry does not stop there.186 “We must, of necessity, also con-
sider the constitutional limitation of the right to privacy on the Chronicle’s
right to know.”187 Following the rulings on Great Falls Tribune and Whit-
lock, the Court held that since the misconduct went directly to the police
officer’s breach of his position of public trust, his conduct is a proper matter
for public scrutiny.188 In so doing, Justice Nelson had to reconcile the
Court’s earlier decisions in Engrav and Allstate.
In the remand order, the Court required the district court to conduct an
in camera inspection to determine whether any portions of the investigatory
report were entitled to be “redacted” to protect the privacy of the victim and
any witnesses.189 In so doing, the Court applied the two-part test, conclud-
ing that while the police officer did not have a right of privacy in the report,
the victims and witnesses did; further, in executing this in camera obliga-
tion, the district court had to apply the balancing test of Article II, Section 9
against a diminished right of privacy, redacting only information related to
third party witnesses.190
The Court moved from this two-step analysis to a three-step analysis a
few years later. In 1995, the Court decided Becky v. Butte-Silver Bow
School District No. 1.191 There, petitioner-parents sought records disclosing
why their son was not selected to the National Honor Society at Butte
High.192 While the Court concluded that the records belonged to the Na-
tional Honor Society and not the district and were therefore not “public
records,” it nonetheless analyzed the case under Article II, Section 9, an-
nouncing a three-step analysis:
First, we consider whether the provision applies to the particular political sub-
division against whom enforcement is sought. Second, we determine whether
the documents in question are “documents of public bodies” subject to public
inspection. Finally, if the first two requirements are satisfied, we decide
whether a privacy interest is present, and if so, whether the demand of indi-
vidual privacy clearly exceeds the merits of public disclosure.193
Next, in 1998, the Court addressed whether the government could
close a meeting or withhold access to documents in order to get the “best
185. Id. at 439 (citing Great Falls Tribune Co. v. Cascade Cnty. Sheriff, 775 P.2d 1267, 1268 (Mont.
1989)).
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 440–41.
189. Id. at 442.
190. Bozeman Daily Chronicle, 859 P.2d at 441–42.
191. 906 P.2d 193 (Mont. 1995).
192. Id. at 194.
193. Id. at 196.
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deal” for the taxpayers of Montana. In Great Falls Tribune Co. v. Day,194
the Court determined that under the plain language of Article II, Section 9,
a governmental entity could not deny the public the opportunity to observe
its deliberations and inspect public documents to gain an economic benefit
because “[e]conomic advantage is not a privacy interest.”195
Later that same year, the Court held that records of a state prison in-
mate were “documents of public bodies” within the meaning of Article II,
Section 9.196 It reiterated the necessary procedure when a request for copies
of such documents was made.
We hold that the Inmates’ parole files are documents of a public body to
which the right to know applies. We determine that once a party requests
access to an Inmate’s file, it is incumbent upon the Board of Pardons to assert
the privacy and penological interests involved. Only where the Board of Par-
dons or reviewing court determines that “the demand of individual privacy
clearly exceeds the merits of public disclosure,” Art. II, § 9, Mont. Const., or
that a legitimate penological interest is served by nondisclosure, may access
to an Inmate’s parole files be denied.197
Since a “penological interest” is not specifically mentioned in Article
II, Section 9, it is difficult to reconcile Worden with Great Falls Tribune v.
Day. If the plain language of the right-to-know provision cannot be read to
include consideration of an economic benefit, it is difficult to understand
how a penological interest could be read into the privacy exception.
In the last decision rendered by the Court in 1998, the Court reverted
to its doubling up rationale, holding that Article II, Section 9 must be “bal-
anced” by the right of privacy contained in Article II, Section 10. In Lincoln
County Commission v. Nixon,198 the Court reversed a district court dismis-
sal of claim filed by Lincoln County commissioners to obtain access to a
criminal investigative file without examining the documents in camera.
Since the Court made no decision on the merits, the doubling up in the
Court’s opinion had no substantive impact on the outcome of the case.
The following year, the Court addressed its own obligations under Ar-
ticle II, Section 9 in In re Selection of a Fifth Member to Montana District-
ing.199 The issue arose when the Court undertook its obligation to appoint a
fifth member of the reapportionment commission. Before the Court deliber-
ated on its appointment, Justice Nelson moved for the Court to deliberate in
open session. It was his view that Article II, Section 9 applied to all govern-
194. 959 P.2d 508, 513–14 (Mont. 1998).
195. Id. at 514.
196. Worden v. Montana Bd. of Pardons & Parole, 962 P.2d 1157, 1161–62 (Mont. 1998).
197. Id. at 1165.
198. Lincoln Cnty. Comm’n v. Nixon, 968 P.2d 1141, 1145 (Mont. 1998).
199. In re Selection of a Fifth Member to Montana Districting, 1999 WL 608661 (Mont. Aug. 3,
1999).
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mental bodies, including the Supreme Court. His motion failed 5-2. Justice
Nelson agreed with the candidate ultimately selected by the Court, but dis-
sented from the Court’s decision to deliberate in private.200 He wrote:
Hence, not only the plain language but also the constitutional history of these
companion provisions of the Montana Constitution show that Article II, Sec-
tion 9, is broader than Article II, Section 8. Article II, Section 9, gives the
public the right to observe the deliberations of all public bodies and agencies
while Article II, Section 8, gives the public the right to participate only in the
operations of agencies. That, of course, begs the question whether this Court
is a “public body.” The answer to this question is undeniably “yes.”201
Justice Terry Trieweiler joined Justice Nelson in calling for open de-
liberations by the Court. Justice Jim Regnier wrote an opinion in which he
disagreed with the dissenting opinions of Justices Nelson and Trieweiler.
While giving lip service to open government (“I also join my colleagues,
Justices Nelson and Trieweiler, in their strong belief in open government. It
is not only the right view, it is mandated by our Constitution.”), he dis-
agreed, nonetheless.202 He acknowledged that the Court has been “vigilant
and uncompromising in rejecting other governmental bodies’ attempts to
limit or subvert this right,” but said he did not believe that Article II, Sec-
tion 9 of Montana’s Constitution applied to the deliberations of the Mon-
tana Supreme Court.203
This same split on the Court manifested two years later in Goldstein v.
Commission on Practice of Supreme Court,204 where a majority of the
Court refused to apply the right-to-know provision to the Court. The two
attorneys in Goldstein attacked the confidentiality provisions of the deliber-
ations of the Court’s Commission on Practice.205 The attorneys argued that
the Court’s rule on confidentiality of Commission proceedings violated
their right to know under Article II, Section 9 of Montana’s Constitution.206
The Court summarily rejected this argument, citing the majority views of
Justices Regnier and Leaphart in In re Selection of a Fifth Member to Mon-
tana Districting.207 Justice Nelson, of course, wrote a thorough and
thoughtful dissent.208 He started the dissent with a pithy observation: “Mon-
tana is the Last Best Place for many things. In terms of a constitutionally
200. Id. at *1.
201. Id. at *3.
202. Id. at *9–10 (Regnier, J., concurring).
203. Id.
204. 995 P.2d 923, 931 (Mont. 2000).
205. Id. at 925.
206. Id. at 931.
207. Id. at 931–32 (citing In re Selection of a Fifth Member to Montana Districting, 1999 WL
608661 (Mont. Aug. 3, 1999)).
208. Id. at 932–48 (Nelson, J., dissenting).
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sufficient lawyer disciplinary system, however, Montana is simply last!”209
He believed that the Court was “clearly an ‘entity . . . of the . . . judicial
branch of this state,’ and, therefore a ‘governmental body’” within the
meaning of Article II, Section 9.210 “It also ‘necessarily follows,’” he con-
cluded, “that the COP, as the disciplinary arm of the judicial branch of
government, is an agency of state government to which Article II, Section
9, applies.”211
In Associated Press, Inc. v. Montana Department of Revenue,212 the
Court reiterated that access claims require “a balancing of the competing
constitutional interests in the context of the facts of each case, to determine
whether the demands of individual privacy clearly exceed the merits of pub-
lic disclosure.” Accordingly, any government rule, policy, or statute that
prohibits access to information retained by the agency without adherence to
the constitutionally mandated balancing test is invalid on its face. Justice
Nelson filed a separate concurring opinion in the case citing the Heliker/
Dahood exchange during the Convention debates and concluded that corpo-
rations were not entitled to protections under the Montana right of privacy
because that right belongs only to natural persons.213
In its third ruling in 2000 construing Article II, Section 9, the Court
reverted to its earlier analysis, short-shrifting the right to know by favoring
the right of privacy contained in Article II, Section 10. In Pengra v.
State,214 the claimant, the father of an injured daughter, asserted the right of
privacy on behalf of his daughter and sought a court order sealing the settle-
ment documents. At the time, Montana Code Annotated § 2–9–303 re-
quired that the settlement of all tort claims against a governmental entity be
open.215 The father asked the district court to seal the settlement documents,
arguing that the statute violated his daughter’s right to privacy.216 Looking
to its early rulings in Engrav and Montana Human Rights Commission, the
Court characterized the constitutional issue, stating that statutes which con-
flict with the Montana Constitution are subordinate to the constitution and
the Court must interpret these conflicting statutes to harmonize with the
constitution.217 “This leads inexorably to the larger question concerning the
conflict here presented between the constitutional right to privacy and the
209. Id. at 933.
210. Goldstein, 995 P.2d at 945 (quoting MONT. CODE ANN. § 18–4–123(11) (2015)).
211. Id. (quoting Great Falls Tribune Co. v. Day, 959 P.2d 508, 512 (Mont. 1998) (Nelson, J.,
dissenting)).
212. 4 P.3d 5 (Mont. 2000).
213. Id. at 22 (Nelson, J., concurring).
214. 14 P.3d 499, 503 (Mont. 2000).
215. Id. at 501 (quoting MONT. CODE ANN. § 2–9–303 (2000)).
216. Id. at 500.
217. Id. at 502.
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constitutional right to know.”218 Nonetheless, the Court concluded that the
father failed to prove that his daughter’s privacy interests were implicated
by disclosure of the settlement documents and found a compelling state
interest in disclosure of settlement amounts in tort actions with the State:
Disclosure of such agreements provides an irreplaceable opportunity for tax-
payers to assess the seriousness of unlawful and negligent activities of their
public institutions. The taxpayers are entitled to know how much they must
pay for such actions or inactions. And without muzzling the entire legislative
process and all those involved in obtaining the appropriation to pay the claim,
it appears that whatever privacy right the settling party has will be compro-
mised, anyway, when the legislature appropriates the funds to pay the settle-
ment.219
In 2002, the Court held that an ad hoc committee formed for the pur-
pose of advising the trustees of a Billings school district about the closure
of several Yellowstone County schools was subject to the open meetings
laws, reversing a district court determination that since the committee only
had one member of the school board it was not a subcommittee of the board
subject to Montana Code Annotated § 2–3–201.220 The trustee member of
the group had written an analysis of the issue involved in closing the vari-
ous schools.221 After the group made its recommendations about closure to
the Board, one of the parents (the Petitioner in the case) discovered that the
group had relied on the trustee’s analysis which had been withheld from the
public.222 She argued that withholding the analysis not only deprived her of
her rights under Article II, Section 9, but also her right to participate under
Article II, Section 8.223 The Court ruled that “Article II, Section 9, is
broader in application than Article II, Section 8. Article II, Section 9, ap-
plies to public bodies as well as governmental agencies.”224 The Court de-
fined a “public or governmental body” to include “a group of individuals
organized for a governmental or public purpose.”225 The Court agreed, con-
cluding that Petitioner’s right to know and participate were both denied by
the board, and the remedy was to void the board’s closure decisions.226
Finally, in 2003, thirty years after the ratification of Article II, Section
9, the Court reversed itself on whether corporations were entitled to privacy
protections. Central to the issue resolved in Great Falls Tribune v. Montana
218. Id.
219. Id. at 503.
220. Bryan v. Yellowstone Cnty. Elementary Sch. Dist., 60 P.3d 381, 384–94 (Mont. 2002).
221. Id. at 384–85.
222. Id. at 385.
223. Id. at 388.
224. Id. at 387.
225. Id.
226. Bryan, 60 P.3d at 392–94.
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Public Service Commission227 was a Public Service Commission (PSC) rule
which sealed all information submitted by a public utility in support of rate
changes, unless an objector could show that it was not entitled to “trade
secret” protections from disclosure under the due process clause. Neither
the Montana Power Company nor the PSC asserted a right of privacy as a
basis for keeping the information confidential. Nonetheless, the Court took
the case as an opportunity to reverse the Mountain States decision that cor-
porations were not protected by Article II, Section 9 or Section 10.228 How-
ever, the significance of the case was the Court’s reliance on Delegate
Eck’s explanation of the purpose of Article II, Section 9, that government
records, whether supplied by private entities or generated by the govern-
ment itself, were presumed to be open for public inspection.229 The PSC
rule that automatically shielded utility filings from public disclosure over-
stepped the Montana Constitution.  Justice Nelson again filed a special con-
currence expressing his concern that permitting a “trade secret” to justify
confidentiality was a slippery slope unless the Court narrowly interpreted
the term.230
In Jefferson County v. Montana Standard,231 the county sought declar-
atory judgment on the newspaper’s request for disclosure of information
regarding the arrest of a county commissioner who entered a guilty plea to
driving under the influence of alcohol and driving with an expired license.
The district court ordered disclosure.232 The county commissioner ap-
pealed.233 The Court held that any expectation the county commissioner
had as to the privacy of information regarding her arrest was unreasona-
ble.234 Thus, the right-to-privacy provision of the Montana Constitution did
not preclude disclosure of such information to newspapers pursuant to the
right-to-know provision of the Montana Constitution.235 Acknowledging
that the rights granted under the right-to-know provision are not absolute,
the Court concluded that the right-to-privacy provision of the Montana
Constitution limits the right to receive confidential criminal justice informa-
tion.236 Accordingly, the Montana Standard’s constitutional right to know
must be balanced against the county commissioner’s constitutional right to
privacy under Article II, Section 10. However, the Court did not mention
227. 82 P.3d 876 (Mont. 2003).
228. Id. at 882–83.
229. Id. at 885.
230. Id. at 890 (Nelson, J., concurring).
231. 79 P.3d 805, 807 (Mont. 2003).
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 809.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 808 (citing Bozeman Daily Chronicle v. City of Bozeman Police Dep’t, 859 P.2d 435,
439 (Mont. 1993); Lacy v. City of Billings, 780 P.2d 186, 188 (Mont. 1989)).
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the compelling interest test in its ruling. The Court simply followed the
public trust doctrine and applied the Article II, Section 9, balancing test to
determine the records should be disclosed.
In Associated Press v. Crofts,237 the Court faced an open meetings
dispute in which the Commissioner of Higher Education had formed an ad
hoc “policy committee” to discuss matters directly related to the govern-
ance of the university system. The committee discussed issues such as: pol-
icy changes; tuition and fee changes; budgeting issues; contractual issues;
employee salaries; and legislative initiatives. The policy committee also ad-
vised the Commissioner on matters related to these issues. The Commis-
sioner argued that because the committee was not a formalized governmen-
tal body, it was not subject to the open meetings laws.238
The Court rejected this argument and devised a test for determining
when such ad hoc bodies must comply with Montana’s open meetings laws:
We conclude that under Montana’s constitution and statutes, which must be
liberally interpreted in favor of openness, factors to consider when determin-
ing if a particular committee’s meetings are required to be open to the public
include: (1) whether the committee’s members are public employees acting in
their official capacity; (2) whether the meetings are paid for with public
funds; (3) the frequency of the meetings; (4) whether the committee deliber-
ates rather than simply gathers facts and reports; (5) whether the deliberations
concern matters of policy rather than merely ministerial or administrative
functions; (6) whether the committee’s members have executive authority and
experience; and (7) the result of the meetings.239
In Svaldi v. Anaconda–Deer Lodge County,240 the Court held that a
public school teacher entrusted with the care and instruction of children
held a position of public trust and, therefore, the public had a right to view
records from an investigation into the teacher’s abuse of students.241 The
case arose in an unusual manner. The plaintiff-teacher sued the county for
invasion of privacy caused by the county attorney’s disclosure of a deferred
prosecution in a criminal case involving alleged abusive behavior by the
teacher toward some of her pupils.242 The plaintiff cited Engrav to show
that until charges were actually filed, a potential defendant retains privacy
rights.243 The Court rejected this argument and relied on Great Falls Trib-
une and Whitlock to conclude that as a teacher entrusted with the care and
instruction of children, the plaintiff had a position of public trust, thus the
237. 89 P.3d 971, 975 (Mont. 2004).
238. Id. at 975.
239. Id. at 975–76.
240. 106 P.3d 548 (Mont. 2005).
241. Id. at 553 (citing Great Falls Tribune Co. v. Cascade Cnty. Sheriff, 775 P.2d 1267, 1269 (Mont.
1989); Citizens to Recall Whitlock v. Whitlock, 844 P.2d 74, 77 (Mont. 1992)).
242. Id. at 550.
243. Id. at 551–52 (citing Engrav v. Cragun, 769 P.2d 1224, 1228 (Mont. 1989)).
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allegations of misconduct went directly to her public duties.244 The Court
made no mention of the compelling interest test.
The Court also affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judg-
ment on the teacher’s privacy claims, noting:
Svaldi cannot seriously claim her privacy rights were violated by the release
of the initial offense report when it was already public knowledge that the
allegations were against her, what the allegations were, who was involved as
complainants, that she was the subject of a School Board investigation con-
cerning the allegations, and that her intended retirement from teaching was
connected to these same allegations. Grayson was justified in releasing the
report.245
The Montana Supreme Court heard its next case concerning privacy
and the right to know in 2005. Yellowstone County v. Billings Gazette,246
arose because the Gazette had been covering a dispute among the employ-
ees of the Yellowstone County public defender’s office involving allega-
tions of discrimination and sexual harassment. The antagonist chief public
defender was deposed in a lawsuit brought by an employee who had been
terminated. The Gazette asked the county for a copy of the deposition. The
county, hoping to avoid an award of attorney fees, filed a declaratory judg-
ment action against the Gazette, asking the district court to engage in the
balancing test. The district court released the deposition but in a signifi-
cantly redacted form. The Gazette appealed.247
In reversing the district court, the Court characterized earlier rulings as
creating a judicial rule that: “society is not willing to recognize as reasona-
ble the privacy interest of individuals who hold positions of public trust
when the information sought bears on that individual’s ability to perform
public duties.”248 Applying this rule, the Court held the deponent, as In-
terim Chief Public Defender for Yellowstone County, held a position of
public trust and was charged with safeguarding the public’s fundamental
constitutional rights to counsel, a fair and speedy trial, preserving public
confidence in the judicial system, and preserving these rights for every
member of society. Consequently, the Court held, the Interim Chief Public
Defender’s subjective expectation of privacy was diminished in matters in-
volving his official duties. The Court ordered disclosure of the deposition
with names of third party witnesses redacted. In passing, the Court cited the
compelling interest requirement of Article II, Section 10, but did not apply
244. Id. at 553 (citing Cascade Cnty. Sheriff, 775 P.2d at 1269; Citizens to Recall Whitlock, 844
P.2d at 77).
245. Id.
246. 143 P.3d 135, 137 (Mont. 2006).
247. Id. at 138–39.
248. Id. at 140 (citing Cascade Cnty. Sheriff, 775 P.2d at 1269; City of Bozeman Police Dep’t, 859
P.2d at 440–41; Svaldi v. Anaconda-Deer Lodge Cnty., 106 P.3d 548, 553 (Mont. 2005).
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the test or conclude that the county had a compelling interest in disclosing
the deposition.249
It was not until 2006, 34 years after ratification of the Constitution,
that the Court recognized the fallacy of coupling Article II, Section 9, right-
to-know reasoning with the compelling interest requirement of Section 10.
In T.L.S. v. Montana Advocacy Program,250 a case rarely cited in subse-
quent decisions, the Court rejected the doubling-up effect of demanding a
requestor establish a “compelling interest” in the records as a component of
the balancing test under Article II, Section 9. Instead, the Court denied re-
lief based on the proposition that the right to privacy guaranteed by Article
II, Section 10, must be balanced in light of the facts of each case. The Court
recognized that in performing the balancing test, the district court had com-
bined the language contained in Article II, Sections 9 and 10, forcing the
requestor to establish a compelling state interest in releasing the sealed
court documents sufficient to outweigh T.L.S.’s privacy interests in those
documents. Since the Montana Advocacy Program had not established a
compelling state interest, the district court denied the motion for leave to
release the documents.251 On appeal, the Court finally disposed of the doub-
ling-up standard by ruling:
[T]he constitutional right to examine documents of public bodies is presumed
in the absence of a showing of individual privacy rights sufficient to override
that right. Thus, once it is determined that requested documents are docu-
ments of public bodies subject to public inspection pursuant to Article II,
Section 9, it is incumbent upon the party asserting individual privacy rights to
establish that the privacy interests clearly exceed the merits of public disclo-
sure.252
The Court concluded the district court erred by demanding the reques-
tor establish a compelling state interest warranting public disclosure of the
sealed court documents under the third step of the Article II, Section 9,
analysis.253
In the ten years following the Court’s clear and unambiguous decision
in T.L.S., it has only been cited twice, and neither case cited the Court’s
rejection of the compelling interest test in right-to-know jurisprudence.254
Instead, the Court continued to emphasize the Article II, Section 10, com-
pelling interest standard when evaluating right-to-know cases. It is appar-
249. Id. at 139–41.
250. 144 P.3d 818 (Mont. 2006).
251. Id. at 824–25.
252. Id. at 824.
253. Id. at 825.
254. Montana Police Protective Ass’n v. Public Emp. Ret. Bd, No. BDV-2007-852, 2008 Mont.
Dist. LEXIS 288 at *8 (July 10, 2008); State v. McClelland, 357 P.3d 906, 909 (Mont. 2015).
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ently easier for the Court to ignore the ruling when considering a balancing
analysis that favors closure of a meeting or document.
In Board of Trustees, Cut Bank Public Schools v. Cut Bank Pioneer
Press,255 the Court first addressed the federal law related to the privacy of
student records. After an altercation on school grounds, the Pioneer Press
requested information from the local school board about the discipline im-
posed on the offending students.256 The board refused to provide the infor-
mation after determining that the students’ rights to privacy clearly ex-
ceeded the merits of public disclosure. The district court, however, consid-
ered the records to be protected under the Family Educational Rights and
Privacy Act (FERPA).257 Pioneer contended that FERPA did not protect
the information it has requested because “FERPA does not prohibit disclo-
sure of redacted records,” rather, it only prohibits the disclosure of “person-
ally identifiable information.”258 Pioneer argued in the alternative that
“even if FERPA did protect the records at issue,” FERPA did not preempt
the Montana Constitution.259 The district court disagreed, and dismissed the
case; Pioneer appealed.260 The Court reversed, holding that FERPA did not
prevent disclosure of the requested information.261 The Court then applied
the three-step analysis and concluded that while a student privacy interest
existed, society would recognize this privacy interest as reasonable and it
did not clearly outweigh the merits of disclosure.262
In 2006, the Billings Gazette requested from the Commission on Prac-
tice (Commission) and the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (ODC) docu-
ments relating to the discipline of a former Billings City Attorney.263 Citing
the Rules of Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement (RLDE), the ODC declined
to provide the documents.264 At the time, the RLDE permitted an attorney
to make a “conditional admission” of the misconduct and accept discipline,
thereby rendering the records related to the charges wholly confidential.265
In May 2006, the Gazette filed a petition to obtain the records, arguing that
the City Attorney was vested with public trust and the misconduct involved
a violation of that trust, resulting in a diminished right of privacy.266 The
district court declined to grant relief upon grounds that it did not have the
255. 160 P.3d 482, 486 (Mont. 2007).
256. Id. at 484.
257. Id. at 483.
258. Id. at 486.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 484.
261. Cut Bank Pioneer Press, 160 P.3d at 488.
262. Id. at 488–89.
263. Billings Gazette v. Commission on Practice ex rel. State, 190 P.3d 1126, 1128 (Mont. 2008).
264. Id.
265. Id. at 1129; see MONT. R. LAWYER DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT 20, 26.
266. Billings Gazette, 190 P.3d at 1128.
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authority to order the Commission or the ODC to release documents pro-
tected by rules promulgated by the Montana Supreme Court under its con-
stitutional authority.267 On appeal, the Court avoided the right-to-know is-
sue, holding that since the Supreme Court had exclusive jurisdiction over
lawyer discipline and had adopted the ODC rules, the district court lacked
authority to grant the requested relief.268 At the time the case was submit-
ted, Attorney General Mike McGrath defended the ODC.269
Later that year, Attorney General McGrath was elected Chief Justice
of the Montana Supreme Court, and the Gazette filed a declaratory judg-
ment original proceeding, facially challenging the RLDE as violative of Ar-
ticle II, Section 9.270 The Court again dodged the issue, declining to take
original jurisdiction, but acknowledging that the Gazette’s petition had “ar-
guable merit.”271 The Court entered an order initiating a public rule-making
process.272 The Gazette was invited to participate in that process.273 The
first proposed rule offered by the Court completely eliminated the confiden-
tial “conditional admission” and opened the entire disciplinary process. The
ODC could continue to issue private “non-disciplinary” letters of caution in
limited cases.274 The Court continued this rule-making process over the
next two years and inexplicably adopted a final rule which retained all of
the confidentiality treatments of the original rule.275 The new rules still per-
mitted an attorney to make a conditional admission, in which case all of the
background information would be kept confidential.276 The only change
was that in cases of a “conditional admission” only those disciplines labeled
as “public” would be made public.277 The Court still retained the ability to
impose “private admonitions,” but subjected the determination of whether
to impose private discipline to the balancing test of Article II, Section 9.278
267. Id.
268. Id. at 1128–29.
269. Id. at 1126.
270. Petition for Declaratory Relief at *4, In re the Supreme Court Rule on Attorney Discipline,
https://perma.cc/H3BS-N7Y6 (Nov. 3, 2008) (No. OP 08-0556).
271. In re Supreme Court Rule on Attorney Discipline, No. OP 08-0556, 2008 Mont. LEXIS 709, at
*2 (Nov. 26, 2008).
272. Id. at *2.
273. Id. at *2–3.
274. In re Revising the Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement, No. AF 06-0628, Order at *4
(Mont. Nov. 9 2010), https://supremecourtdocket.mt.gov/view/AF%2006-0628%20Rule%20Change%
20—%20Order?id= {9B125C7E-A6D2-48D1-A02E-5A4564E155BA} (Nelson, J., dissenting).
275. Id.
276. MONT. R. LAWYER DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT 20(B)(3), 26(D).
277. Id. at 20(B)(3).
278. Id. at 13.
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Justice Nelson dissented from the order imposing the new disciplinary
rules.279 He characterized the two-year process thus: “we are essentially
back to where we started—at square one.”280 Justice Nelson wrote:
If we expect the public to respect Montana’s lawyer disciplinary system, if we
strive to instill universal confidence in the process, fairness and effectiveness
of that system, if we are truly serious about demonstrating that the policing of
our own profession actually works, then making the entire disciplinary pro-
cess transparent is an indispensable step in obtaining these goals.281
He believed the new RLDE fell well short of achieving these goals and was
constitutionally impermissible. Accordingly, the RLDE remained “translu-
cent.”282
During the two years the Court considered its attorney disciplinary rule
changes, it conducted open sessions in which it heard from various inter-
ested parties and actually deliberated on these rules openly.283 While the
Court elected to keep the curtain drawn on attorney disciplines, it began to
shed light on its own internal processes. It was during this time that the
Court began to open meetings in which “administrative” decisions unrelated
to its appellate duties were discussed. This practice continues to date. The
Court provides agendas for these meetings and holds its conferences con-
cerning administrative matters in open session.
In Billings Gazette v. City of Billings,284 the Court dealt with a records
request for disclosure of a “due process” letter to a police department em-
ployee detailing evidence gathered in investigation of the former em-
ployee’s alleged misuse of a city credit card.285 While the employee had
authorization to use the card, the employee was not high in the police de-
partment hierarchy.286 The district court performed the two-pronged balanc-
ing test concluding that the employee’s job, while not high in the police
department, allowed her to spend large amounts of public monies and was,
therefore, a “position of trust.”287 The court then determined the employee
did not have a reasonable privacy expectation in the results of an formal
internal investigation into wrongdoing associated with her alleged mishan-
dling those funds.288
On its review of the district court ruling, the Court began its discussion
by citing the Montana Human Rights Division and Missoulian rulings, not-
279. In re Revising the Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement, at *2.
280. Id. at *4.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. 267 P.3d 11, 15 (Mont. 2011).
285. Id. at 13.
286. Id. at 13–14.
287. Id. at 14.
288. Id.
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ing, “[t]he public’s right to know, however, must be balanced with an indi-
vidual’s right to privacy. . . . Since our 1972 Constitution was adopted, we
have recognized that the only exception to the restriction against the inva-
sion of individual privacy is a compelling state interest.”289 However, the
majority in a 4-3 decision determined that the district court did not err in
balancing the rights, and declined to apply the Court’s prior jurisprudence
finding an employee’s right to privacy was paramount.
It bears noting that the Gazette is not seeking her personnel file; it is seeking
only the due process letter which all parties agree constitutes a public docu-
ment. Neither Anthony’s status nor her reasonable expectations are logically
akin to those of the innocuous job applicants in Montana Human Rights or the
university presidents undergoing a routine performance evaluation in Missou-
lian. We do not seek to undermine our holdings in either case. Rather, we
distinguish the cases on the basis of their disparate facts.290
Chief Justice McGrath cast the crucial fourth vote for the majority, but
expressed concern that the public trust determination ought not be made
based on the nature of the employees’ duties (precisely what the district
court had done below).291 But, the Chief noted in his concurring opinion:
Courts should not conclude that merely holding a government position that
involves the expenditure of public funds automatically places that person in a
“position of public trust,” trumping the potential expectation of privacy that
employee has in the subject matter of a personnel investigation conducted by
her employer.292
In his dissent, Justice Brian Morris, joined by Justices Beth Baker and
James Rice, relied heavily on Missoulian, Montana Human Rights Division
and Belth and, without expressly applying the compelling interest test, ar-
gued that the majority ruling “adds nothing to the balancing of public rights
and private interests inherent in Art. II, Sections 9 and 10 of Montana’s
Constitution when applied to disclosure of personnel related documents.”293
Justice Morris believed that “[t]he character of the documents at issue
should control the outcome of the balancing test rather than the position of
the person about whom the documents pertained.”294 Moreover, Justice
Morris argued that confidentiality was a public employer’s “strongest
weapon to control wrongdoing in the workplace.”295 He felt secrecy, not
open government, promoted candid communication between an employer
and an employee; he believed this secrecy constituted good public policy
289. Id. at 15 (citing Montana Human Rights Div. v. Billings, 649 P.2d 1283, 1288 (Mont. 1982)).
290. Billings Gazette, 267 P.3d at 17.
291. Id. at 18–19 (McGrath, C.J., concurring).
292. Id. at 19.
293. Id. at 20–23 (Morris, J., dissenting).
294. Id. at 20.
295. Id. at 22.
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and served as a basis for a reasonable expectation of privacy in the clerk’s
due process letter:
The Court’s refusal to recognize this privacy interest will encourage employ-
ees in future cases to remain silent during an internal investigation. This si-
lence will hinder the effectiveness of a Garrity warning, and, more impor-
tantly, prevent an employer from taking quick action to ensure the integrity of
public institutions. Innumerable situations—from sexual harassment to allega-
tions of embezzlement—may require a public employer to take swift action to
control a workplace. Today’s decision likely will limit a public employer’s
ability to take swift corrective action.296
The Billings Gazette case revealed a deeply divided Court. Only a thin
majority favored openness, with the Chief Justice holding the swing vote.
Two years later, the Court reversed a district court order that the City
of Billings disclose an unredacted disciplinary file on five employees disci-
plined for viewing pornography on their work computers. In Billings Ga-
zette v. City of Billings,297 the Court appeared to follow Justice McGrath’s
cautionary concurring opinion from the 2011 Billings Gazette case, and be-
cause the employees were not vested with public trust, they had undimin-
ished expectations of privacy in their disciplinary files.
The majority opinion starts with an ominous observation:
Montana’s right to privacy is established in Article II, Section 10 of the Mon-
tana Constitution: “Right of privacy. The right of individual privacy is essen-
tial to the wellbeing of a free society and shall not be infringed without the
showing of a compelling state interest.”298
The majority then cites with approval the early decisional law support-
ing confidentiality.299 Drawing heavily from Missoulian and Montana
Human Rights Division, Justice Rice, writing for the majority, concluded,
“[h]ere, the Employees are not elected officials, high-level management, or
department heads, nor is there evidence that any specific duty alleged to
have been violated related to the performance of a public trust function.”300
Accordingly, the Court held:
[S]ociety would be willing to accept as reasonable a public employee’s expec-
tation of privacy in his or her identity with respect to internal disciplinary
matters when that employee is not in a position of public trust, and the mis-
conduct resulting in the discipline was not a violation of a duty requiring a
high level of public trust.301
Arriving at this conclusion, Justice Rice knew the Court was departing
from well-established precedent. He painstakingly went through each of the
296. Billings Gazette, 267 P.3d at 22 (Morris, J., dissenting).
297. 313 P.3d 129 (Mont. 2013).
298. Id. at 133 (quoting MONT. CONST. art. II, § 10).
299. Id. at 135–36.
300. Id. at 140.
301. Id.
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Court’s prior decisions and attempted to find factors that could distinguish
the Court’s holding.302 Ultimately, Justice Rice ended the analysis by creat-
ing a new class of “administrative employees” who have a higher expecta-
tion of privacy in misconduct than elected officials or high-level employ-
ees.303 This sleight of hand became obvious when he added, “Similarly, an
employee may have a lower expectation of privacy in misconduct related to
a duty of public trust, such as responsibility for spending public money or
educating children.”304 In short, the expectation of privacy in misconduct
would be whatever the Court decided. And, while the majority did not ex-
pressly conclude that no compelling interest exists in disclosing names of
the administrative employees in question, the Court nevertheless ruled as
much. The concluding paragraph of the majority opinion observes:
Montanans are provided a “heightened expectation of privacy” under the
Montana Constitution in comparison to the U.S. Constitution, State v. 1993
Chevrolet Pickup, 2005 MT 180, ¶ 9, 328 Mont. 10, 116 P.3d 800, and Article
II, Sections 9 and 10 of the Montana Constitution explicitly require that a
balancing of the right to know and the right to privacy be conducted in this
case. This Court’s precedent provides the appropriate analysis of the particu-
lar state constitutional provisions that govern here, without regard to Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence or federal approaches to the issue.305
The majority was likely influenced by Justice Morris’s dissent in the
2011 Gazette case. Based on that dissent, the City argued that confidential-
ity was an important factor in the disciplinary process because it fostered
honest communications between the employer and employee.306 The major-
ity embraced this notion by concluding “general assertions that public dis-
closure will foster public confidence in public institutions and maintain ac-
countability for public officers are not sufficient to establish a strong public
interest.”307 Here, the Court announces a principle that directly contravenes
the stated purpose of Article II, Section 9, as articulated by the Convention
Delegates and discussed, supra.
Justices Laurie McKinnon and Patricia Cotter dissented, but surpris-
ingly, not based on Article II, Section 9, right-to-know jurisprudence.
Rather, the dissenters focused on the right of privacy and how the state and
federal courts dealt with that right under the Fourth Amendment. Following
precedent in search and seizure cases, the dissenters believed that the of-
fending employees’ conduct deprived them of a reasonable expectation of
302. Id. at 134–38.
303. Billings Gazette v. City of Billings, 313 P.3d 129, 140 (Mont. 2013).
304. Id. at 140.
305. Id.
306. Id. at 140–41.
307. Id. at 141 (citing Missoulian v. Board of Regents, 675 P.2d 962, 972 (Mont. 1984)).
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privacy in their actions, and they were not entitled to keep their names and
conduct secret.308 Justice McKinnon wrote:
I cannot accept that Montana citizens would recognize as reasonable, under
Katz, Mont. Human Rights Div., or any other precedent, this Court’s willing-
ness to shield the identities, positions, departments, and supervisors of public
employees who access pornographic material on their work computers during
work hours after having been warned that their computer usage would be
monitored and that they cannot expect anonymity. I also am not willing to
carve out an exception to the well-established test for determining a constitu-
tionally protected expectation of privacy because we want to protect particu-
lar employees from embarrassment. The reasonableness of an expectation of
privacy depends on what society deems is legitimate, and such a test cannot
logically depend on whether a claim is asserted pursuant to search-and-
seizure jurisprudence or precedent interpreting the right to know.309
In the summer of 2015, Adam Wade, a second-year University of
Montana law student wrote a cogent critique of the 2013 Billings Gazette
ruling.310 He contended this decision marked a significant departure from
the Court’s well-settled right-to-know jurisprudence: “Billings Gazette
eroded the public’s right to know, created ambiguous precedent that will
cause unpredictable results in future cases, and left many unresolved ques-
tions.”311 He prefaced his evaluation of the impact of the decision with a
disciplined parsing of the Court’s right-to-know precedent. He character-
ized the various holdings of the Court (also discussed herein) falling into
one of two categories: cases in which the request for information relates to a
public employee’s official duties, and cases in which the public employee
was given express assurances that their information would not be publicly
released. In the former, the Court found the right of privacy to be clearly
outweighed by the public’s right of access. In the second category, the
Court concluded the right of privacy prevailed over the right to know.312
What confounded Wade about the majority ruling in Billings Gazette
was that the facts of the case fell squarely within the first category, but the
Court declined to so rule.313 Instead, the Court issued what Wade called a
“public trust” exception to the open meeting doctrine, in which the Court
recognized “a public employee’s expectation of privacy in his or her iden-
tity with respect to internal disciplinary matters when that employee is not
in a position of public trust, and the misconduct resulting in the discipline
was not a violation of a duty requiring a high level of public trust.”314 Wade
308. Id. at 146–147 (McKinnon, J., dissenting).
309. Id. at 147–48.
310. Wade, supra note 16. R
311. Id. at 203.
312. Id.at 188–92.
313. Id. at 198, 205.
314. Id. at 203–04.
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observed that the Court’s unwillingness to apply its traditional right-to-
know analysis eroded well-settled law and created uncertainty about how
the balancing test should be applied in the future.315
Although not mentioned by Wade, there is another, more troublesome
aspect of the 2013 Billings Gazette case that could significantly tilt the bal-
ance away from disclosure. An implication may be drawn from the majority
opinion that part of the rationale for refusing to disclose the names of the
offending city employees was the embarrassment it could cause the em-
ployees if the public knew they were viewing pornography. Certainly, Jus-
tice McKinnon faulted the majority for its refusal to divulge names to shield
the offending employees from public ridicule. The majority reasoned that
causing this embarrassment was unnecessary because the underlying pur-
pose of Article II, Section 9—to permit the public to observe the decision
making process—would not be achieved by revealing the offenders’
names.316 Although the Court’s reasoning here is dicta, it presents an addi-
tional factor the Court could use in the future to deny a requestor’s relief.
Under this new factor, a governmental agency could insist the requestor
justify the reasons for obtaining the document before applying the balanc-
ing test to determine whether, on the public disclosure side of the equation,
the requestor will learn anything about the decision-making process. If not,
regardless of the demands of privacy, the agency could deny disclosure be-
cause the requestor would learn nothing about the decision-making process
from the requested documents.
Nonetheless, in the next case to come before the Court, the Court re-
turned to its traditional right-to-know analysis in affirming a district court
ruling that disciplinary records of a school district employee could be dis-
closed.317 At the time of the lawsuit, the employee had become a controver-
sial figure as the Treasurer of Ravalli County.318 The opinion does not re-
veal whether the employee’s reduced expectation of privacy stemmed from
her new position as an elected officer vested with public trust as district
supervisor of school services who controlled spending.
A year later, the Court concluded that the details of an investigation
into the former director of the Butte-Silver Bow Human Resources Depart-
ment and her consequent firing were not subject to disclosure.319 The issue
arose when the Butte-Silver Bow Council closed a meeting to hear the rea-
sons for the employee’s termination.320 Relying on its earlier Billings Ga-
315. Id.
316. Billings Gazette v. City of Billings, 313 P.3d 129, 141 (Mont. 2013).
317. Missoula Cnty. Pub. Sch. v. Bitterroot Star, 345 P.3d 1035, 1038–39 (Mont. 2015).
318. Id. at 1037.
319. Moe v. Butte-Silver Bow Cnty., 371 P.3d 415, 423 (Mont. 2016).
320. Id. at 418–20.
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zette ruling, the Court found that complaints and information from other
employees spurred the firing, it was appropriate to close the meeting to
protect these witnesses’ privacy.321 The Court buttressed its opinion by ob-
serving:
Public knowledge of the information gathered from other County employees
during a personnel investigation would undermine the County’s interest as an
employer in encouraging candor and willingness of its employees to bring
legitimate complaints to the County’s Chief Executive. As we recognized in
Missoulian and Mont. Human Rights Div., the promotion of candid communi-
cation between an employer and its employees is good public policy. Protect-
ing the confidentiality of such communications helps to encourage employees
not to remain silent during internal investigations of workplace problems.322
The Court first announced this rationale in Missoulian, but had not
applied it to resolve access issues since Flesh in 1990. Certainly, every one
of the Court’s decisions since Flesh involved disclosure of third party com-
plaints and witnesses, but the Court resolved those issues by redacting the
third parties’ names. While Moe involved an open meetings issue, the mat-
ter could have gone forward in open session by not referring to the wit-
nesses by name, so that the public interest in knowing the reasoning for
firing a high-ranking department head could be realized. Moreover, the
Court’s observation (derived from Justice Morris’s view in the 2011 and
2013 Billings Gazette cases) that “general assertions that public disclosure
will foster public confidence in public institutions and maintain accounta-
bility for public officers are not sufficient to establish a strong public inter-
est” could be applied in every access case to deny disclosure.323
The Court’s back-pedaling on right-to-know canon continued in
Krakauer v. Commissioner of Higher Education ex rel. State.324 Jon
Krakauer, a nationally-known author, sought records related to the rein-
statement of the University of Montana’s star quarterback as a student at the
University, notwithstanding a rape allegation brought by another student.
Krakauer asked for the records in connection with a book he was writing on
sexual assault in American colleges and universities. The University presi-
dent had accepted the university court’s recommendation to dismiss the stu-
dent for actions unbecoming of a University student. But the quarterback
remained in school and continued to lead the Grizzly football team. The
Commissioner of Higher Education, who had apparently reversed the deci-
sion of the president, refused to disclose the records of his actions based on
FERPA, in spite of the fact that the Court in the Pioneer Press decision had
321. Id. at 421–22.
322. Id. at 422 (citing Missoulian v. Board of Regents, 675 P.2d 962, 973 (Mont. 1984); Montana
Human Rights Div. v. Billings, 649 P.2d 1283, 1287–88 (Mont. 1982)).
323. Id. at 422.
324. Krakauer v. Commissioner of Higher Educ. ex rel. State, 381 P.3d 524 (Mont. 2016).
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determined that the federal statute was inapplicable to record requests.325 In
Krakauer’s right-to-know action, the district court applied the usual “three-
step” analysis and concluded that the Commissioner had failed to establish
that the student’s right to privacy clearly outweighed the merits of public
disclosure.326
Throughout the litigation, the Commissioner refused to acknowledge
that he had the records, precluding an in camera review.327 On appeal, the
Court, ostensibly concerned that the district court had not reviewed the doc-
uments, remanded the matter back and ordered an in camera review.328
However, the Court made it clear it did not agree with the district court’s
application of its prior access law:
Our concerns over the principles applied by the District Court in the constitu-
tional balancing process, as well as the unique considerations under the fed-
eral and state law applicable to student records, compel us to reverse the Dis-
trict Court’s order and to remand this matter with instructions to the District
Court to conduct an in camera review of the requested records, and to re-
apply the constitutional balancing test to those records in accordance with the
following analysis of the interests here at issue.329
Instead of citing its own well-established rules, the Court elected to
follow an obscure, unpublished, magistrate judge’s ruling from the Middle
District of Pennsylvania, Moeck v. Pleasant Valley,330 creating an entirely
new analysis where courts must balance “an enhanced privacy interest” for
students when applying Article II, Section 9.331
The Court’s ruling must have come as an unexpected surprise for the
Commissioner, who had mentioned the case only in passing in his brief.332
The magistrate judge in Moeck addressed whether plaintiffs pursuing a civil
battery claim were entitled to discover unredacted versions of witness ac-
counts in a school’s investigation of events that gave rise to the civil
claims.333 The issue in the case was whether the plaintiffs had “demon-
strate[ed] a genuine need for the information that outweighs the privacy
interest of the students.”334 Since the plaintiffs “needed” the information in
connection with their lawsuit, the magistrate judge had little trouble order-
325. Id. at 527, 529.
326. Id. at 532–33.
327. Id. at 527, 533.
328. Id. at 533.
329. Id.
330. No. 3:13-CV-1305, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142431 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 7, 2014).
331. Krakauer v. Commissioner of Higher Educ. ex rel. State, 381 P.3d 524, 534 (Mont. 2016)
(citing Moeck, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142431 at *6–7).
332. Appellee’s Response Brief at *25–26, Krakauer v. Commissioner of Higher Educ. ex rel. State,
2015 WL 7783285 (Mont. Nov. 23, 2015) (No. DA 15-0502).
333. Moeck, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *1–2.
334. Id. at *8 (citing Rios v. Read, No. 75 C 296, 73 F.R.D. 589, 599, 1977 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17900,
27 (E.D. N.Y. Jan. 14, 1977)).
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ing production of unredacted versions of the witness statement.335 Nothing
in the magistrate’s ruling reflects application of an enhanced privacy right.
As established in the foregoing discussion, the Court’s traditional
three-point analysis has always considered whether the person holding the
potential privacy interest had an expectation of privacy in the documents.
The basis for that expectation has varied from circumstance to circum-
stance. For example, in the Great Falls Tribune/PSC case, the privacy right
arose from the then extant policy of the PSC to promise confidentiality for
any filing the utility claimed was private.336 Notwithstanding this determi-
nation, the Court did not conclude that the policy created an enhanced right
of privacy.337 If Krakauer can be read to require a reviewing district court
to apply an enhanced privacy right whenever a policy, statute, or promise
indicates that documents will not be made public, the three-step analysis
will skew in favor of privacy. This will truly be the case if the Court also
applies the doubling-up effect of the compelling interest standard under
Section 10. Application of this new reasoning, of course, does significant
harm to the public’s right to know.
Two components of the Court’s ruling in Krakauer are remarkable.
First, the concept of an “enhanced right of privacy” in right-to-know cases
was never urged by the Commissioner and was never briefed by Krakauer.
The Court reached this conclusion without participation by either of the
parties to the appeal. Second, the Court declined to answer all the issues
related to the district court’s efforts to balance privacy with the public’s
right to know. This, despite the fact that the “in camera” issue was not
discussed in the appellate briefing of the parties. Instead, the Court noted:
Both parties argue at great length about various factors at issue here, such as
the publicity that has followed this case, the source of the original request, the
reasons behind the request, the named student’s status as an athlete at a pub-
licly-funded university, and the prior litigation, all of which may be consid-
ered and weighted by the District Court when conducting the balancing test.
We decline to address these issues individually in favor of the District Court’s
application of the balancing test on remand.338
At the time of this writing, the district court conducted its in camera
review of the documents reflecting the Commissioner’s disciplinary process
and the University’s response and ordered their disclosure. The district
court concluded that even under an “enhanced privacy right,” the demands
of individual privacy did not outweigh the merits of disclosure:
335. Id. at *4–5, 6–7, 11 (citing Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., No. 07-3100, 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 38925, at *7 (E.D. Pa. May 7, 2009); Zaal v. Maryland, 602 A.2d 1247, 1256 (Md. 1992)).
336. See Great Falls Tribune v. Montana Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 82 P.3d 876, 879, 887 (Mont. 2003).
337. Id. at 878–79.
338. Krakauer v. Commissioner of Higher Educ. ex rel. State, 381 P.3d 524, 535 (Mont. 2016).
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Here, weighing favorably in Doe’s right to privacy is his enhanced privacy
interest in his student records. On the other hand, a variety of factors weigh
against Doe’s right of privacy and in favor of the public’s right to know. First,
Doe’s status as a high-profile student athlete weighs against his right of pri-
vacy. Prior to the commencement of disciplinary proceedings and criminal
litigation against him, Doe was a well-known individual in Montana and en-
joyed a position of prominence and popularity by virtue of his athletic posi-
tion. Second, the University of Montana is a public institution and Doe, while
not a paid athlete, receives valuable consideration for his skills in the form of
an athletic scholarship. Although he is not a public official or university em-
ployee, Doe is a public representative of the University of Montana. Third,
the details of Doe’s alleged bad acts have been publicly aired through national
and local media coverage, a publicly held criminal trial, and a nationally best-
selling book. Fourth, the public has a compelling interest in understanding the
disciplinary procedures employed by a state university, especially where the
student in question is a prominent and popular campus figure whose educa-
tion is paid for in part by public funds.339
VII. CONCLUSION
As can be seen from this review of right-to-know cases since adoption
of Article II, Section 9, the Court has granted significant life to the purposes
of the provision as envisioned by the Convention delegates. This was par-
ticularly true during the time Justice Nelson occupied a position on the
Court. However, the Court relied on Article II, Section 10 in decisions
where the Court favored privacy over disclosure. In those cases, the Court
insisted that the requestor establish a compelling need for the information—
a difficult task at best, and a contradiction to the concept of open govern-
ment, at worst. While the two- or three-step tests seem well-embedded in
the Court’s decisional law, despite its rejection of the compelling interest
application in T.L.S., the Court can be expected to tip the balance in favor
of privacy in unpredictable ways. It will do so either by creating a new
classification of privacy protections, as it did in the 2013 Billings Gazette
and 2016 Krakauer cases, or by focusing on the “merits of public disclo-
sure” and concluding that good government is served by confidentiality.
Ultimately,  these recent decisions create confusion in right-to-know juris-
prudence and reflect a lack of institutional memory and a disturbing erosion
of the 45-year development of case law enforcing open government in
Montana.
339. Order on Motion for Release of Records, Krakauer v. Commissioner of Higher Educ. ex rel
State, (Mont. 1st Dist. Ct. Oct. 19, 2017) (No. ADV-2014-117).
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